B xxiv - xxxi, ¶ 14

 Text

But it will be asked: What sort of treasure is it that we intend to leave to posterity, in the form of a metaphysics that has been purified through criticism but thereby also brought into a changeless state?e On a cursory overview of this work, one might believe that one perceives it to be only of negative utility, teaching us never to venture with speculative reason beyond the boundaries of experience; and in fact that is its first usefulness. But this utility soon becomes positive when we become aware that the principles with which speculative reason ventures beyond its boundaries do not in fact result in extending our use of reason, but rather, if one considers them more closely, inevitably result in narrowing it by threatening to extend the boundaries of sensibility, to which these principles really belong, beyond everything, and so even to dislodge the use of pure (practical) reason. Hence a critique that limits the speculative use of reason is, to be sure, to that extent negative, but because it simultaneously removes an obstacle that limits or even threatens to wipe out the practical use of reason, this critique is also in fact of positive and very important utility, as soon as we have convinced ourselves that there is an absolutely necessary practical use of pure reason (the moral use), in which reason unavoidably extends itself beyond the boundaries of sensibility, without needing any assistance from speculative reason, but in which it must also be made secure against any counteraction from the latter, in order not to fall into contradiction with itself. To deny that this service of criticism is of any positive utility would be as much as to say that the police are of no positive utility because their chief business is to put a stop to the violence that citizens have to fear from other citizens, so that each can carry on his own affairs in peace and safety.'7 In the analytical part of the critique it is proved that space and time are only forms of sensible intuition, and therefore only conditions of the existence of the things as appearances, further that we have no concepts of the understanding and hence no elements for the cognition of things except insofar as an intuition can be given corresponding to these concepts, consequently that we can have cognition of no object as a thing in itself, but only insofar as it is an object of sensible intuition, i.e. as an appearance; from which follows the limitation of all even possible speculative cognition of reason to mere objects of experience. Yet the reservation must also be well noted, that even if we cannot cognize these same objects as things in themselves, we at least must be able to think them as things in themselves.* For otherwise there would follow the absurd proposition that there is an appearance without anything that appears. Now if we were to assume that the distinction between things as objects of experience and the very same things as things in themselves, which our critique has made necessary, were not made at all, then the principle of causality, and hence the mechanism of nature in determining causality, would be valid of all things in general as efficient causes. I would not be able to say of one and the same thing, e.g., the human soul, that its will is free and yet that it is simultaneously subject to natural necessity, i.e., that it is not free, without falling into an obvious contradiction; because in both propositions I would have taken the soul in just the same meaning, namely as a thing in general (as a thing" in itself), and without prior critique, I could not have taken it otherwise. But if the critique has not erred in teaching that the object should be taken in a twofold meaning, namely as appearance or as thing in itself; if its deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding is correct, and hence the principle of causality applies only to things taken in the first sense, namely insofar as they are objects of experience, while things in the second meaning are not subject to it; then just the same will is thought of in the appearance (in visible actions) as necessarily subject to the law of nature and to this extent not free, while yet on the other hand it is thought of as belonging to a thing in itself as not subject to that law, and hence free, without any contradiction hereby occurring. Now although I cannot cognize my soul, considered from the latter side, through any speculative reason (still less through empirical observation), and hence I cannot cognize freedom as a property of any being to which I ascribe effects in the world of sense, because then I would have to cognize such an existence as determined, and yet not as determined in time (which is impossible, since I cannot support my concept with any intuition), nevertheless, I can think freedom to myself, i.e., the representation of it at least contains no contradiction in itself, so long as our critical distinction prevails between the two ways of representing (sensible and intellectual), along with the limitation of the pure concepts of the understanding arising from it, and hence that of the principles flowing from them. Now suppose that morality necessarily presupposes freedom (in the strictest sense) as a property of our will, citing a priori as data for this freedom certain original practical principles lying in our reason, which would be absolutely impossible without the presupposition of freedom, yet that speculative reason had proved that freedom cannot be thought at all, then that presupposition, namely the moral one, would necessarily have to yield to the other one, whose opposite contains an obvious contradiction; consequently freedom and with it morality (for the latter would contain no contradiction if freedom were not already presupposed) would have to give way to the mechanism of nature. But then, since for morality I need nothing more than that freedom should not contradict itself, that it should at least be thinkable that it should place no hindrance in the way of the mechanism of nature in the same action (taken in another relation), without it being necessary for me to have any further insight into it: the doctrine of morality asserts its place and the doctrine of nature its own, which, however, would not have occurred if criticism had not first taught us of our unavoidable ignorance in respect of the things in themselves and limited everything that we can cognize theoretically to mere appearances. Just the same sort of exposition of the positive utility of critical principles of pure reason can be given in respect to the concepts of God and of the simple nature of our soul, which, however, I forgo for the sake of brevity. Thus I cannot even assume God, freedom and immortality for the sake of the necessary practical use of my reason unless I simultaneously deprive speculative reason of its pretension to extravagant insights; because in order to attain to such insights, speculative reason would have to help itself to principles that in fact reach only to objects of possible experience, and which, if they were to b e applied to what cannot be an object of experience, then they would always actually transform it into an appearance, and thus declare all practical extension of pure reason to be impossible. Thus I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith; and the dogmatism of metaphysics, i.e., the prejudice that without criticism reason can make progress in metaphysics, is the true source of all unbelief conflicting with morality, which unbelief is always very dogmatic. - Thus even if it cannot be all that difficult to leave to posterity the legacy of a systematic metaphysics, constructed according to the cri- tique of pure reason, this is still a gift deserving of no small respect; to see this, we need merely to compare the culture of reason that is set on the course of a secure science with reason's unfounded groping and friv- olous wandering about without critique, or to consider how much bet- ter young people hungry for knowledge might spend their time than in the usual dogmatism that gives so early and so much encouragement to their complacent quibbling about things they do not understand, and things into which neither they nor anyone else in the world will ever have any insight, or even encourages them to launch on the invention of new thoughts and opinions, and thus to neglect to learn the wellgrounded sciences; but we see it above all when we take account of the way criticism puts an end for all future time to objections against moral- ity and religion in a Socratic way, namely by the clearest proof of the ignorance of the opponent. For there has always been some metaphysics or other to be met with in the world, and there will always continue to be one, and with it a dialectic of pure reason, because dialectic is natural to reason. Hence it is the first and most important occupation of philosophy to deprive dialectic once and for all of all disadvantageous influence, by blocking off the source of the errors.

* To cognize an object, it is required that I be able to prove its possibility (whether by the testimony of experience from its actuality or a priori through reason). But I can think whatever I like, as long as I do not contradict myself, i.e., as long as my concept is a possible thought, even if I cannot give any assurance whether or not there is a corresponding object' somewhere within the sum total of all possibilities. But in order to ascribe objective validity to such a concept (real possibility, for the first sort of possibility was merely logical) something more is required. This "more," however, need not be sought in theoretical sources of cognition; it may also lie in practical ones.

Summary

If we wonder what benefits we gain from the critique we find, 1) first a negative benefit of knowing the limits of our cognition and metaphysics, but from this stems 2) a second benefit, which is preventing harm to other areas of our cognition. A metaphysics that overextends itself also overextends the use of its principles and, as a result, these principles conflict with those of other sciences. 3) A third benefit comes if you compare the cultures of metaphysics pre- and post- critique: after critique much less time will be wasted on fighting about illusions which we always have to confront and which 4) a fourth benefit of critique is to be able to handle these dialectics more efficiently since they will periodically arise.

Commentary

Here we see a warrant for the critique but also a brief sketch of an argument that Kant repeats frequently: the case for the compatibility of free will and determinism. This argument, produced by the Critique of Pure Reason, is likely the best warrant for the critical project as a whole and opens a new line of inquiry for metaphysics. Because of its importance it is worth spending some time considering it, however, because Kant only provides a glance at the argument, and also because we will get this argument later in the book, I won't try to provide a complete account for it here.

Free will is our capacity to put ourselves under laws. These laws are called laws of freedom and are distinct from laws of nature. Laws of any kind necessitate something and so if we have more than one kind of law we should see different kinds of necessitation as well. We encounter the necessitation of natural laws in experience whenever something happens, for happening requires that what appears to us has undergone an alteration and so there is a necessary connection to what has come before (namely, the necessary connection of time itself, of the present with the past). The necessitation of laws of freedom are encountered by us in the form of obligation which consists in our thought that we cannot exempt ourselves from performing or abstaining from an action or goal. The laws of nature govern a connection in experience between two moments (in time), while the laws of freedom govern a connection between something which doesn't appear (i.e., the will) and something which would appear (i.e., the act we are obliged to perform).

Laws of nature are laws for experience and ultimately only concern the necessary connection of appearances. Laws of freedom are recognized by us in the form of obligation and when we act we may interpret these actions as not only in accord with these obligations but as arising from them. This connection between our action and the will that performed it as a result of the necessitation of moral laws is a connection between an appearance and something merely intelligible (something we only think). So, we can see that the laws of nature connect experience itself together (apperance to appearance) while laws of freedom connect appearance to something we merely think (i.e., the will). From this we can avoid the contradiction which seemed unavoidable between laws of nature and freedom. Of course, this is no proof of freedom, but only a demonstration that laws of freedom could be consistent with those of nature if these two bodies of law are taken toconcern entirely different kinds of connections.

The example of the conflict between free will and determinism and the critical resolution of the conflict illustrates the points Kant makes in favor of the critique, for 1) we see that a speculative metaphysics is unable to determine a resolution to the conflict since it would require a use of our concepts that transcends experience; 2) it also prevents all manner of confusions that arise from the over-extension of our concepts beyond experience, for as soon as you open the door to this it becomes hard to set a limit to specious inferences; 3) this should help put a stop to many fruitless disputes and in a way satisfactory to both factions and 4) in an efficient manner.

Kant makes a famous statement in this passage which also warrants comment: "I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith;" This quote may be troubling to some or simply curious to others. In brief, what Kant is saying is that critique of pure reason shuts off certain avenues that were thought to open up knowledge of objects such as God and in the place of these hopes for knowledge faith (belief) is the only avenue left. This faith, as has already been suggested in the discussion of free will, is related ultimately to our moral life. As a historical note, there were many controversies in Kant's time between individuals who wanted to employ reason in matters of faith and those who did not. This is another point where Kant seems to be treading a middle path because his solution makes use of reason so far as it is part of our natural disposition (as moral agents), but it suggests we cannot make use of reasoning to come to the conclusions we would wish to have about God.

Terminology

negative (negativ), positive (positiv), speculative reason (spekulative Vernunft), faith/belief (glaube), things in themselves (ding an sich selbst), objects of experience (Gegenstand der Erfahrung), freedom (Freiheit)

B xxii - xxiv, ¶ 13

Text

[¶13] Now the concern of this critique of pure speculative reason consists in that attempt to transform the accepted procedure of metaphysics, undertaking an entire revolution according to the example of the geometers and natural scientists. It is a treatise on the method, not a system of the science itself; but it catalogs the entire outline of the science of metaphysics, both in respect of its boundaries and in respect of its entire internal structure. For pure speculative reason has this peculiarity about it, that it can and should measure its own capacity according to the different ways for choosing the objects of its thinking, and also completely enumerate the manifold ways of putting problems before itself, so as to catalog the entire preliminary sketch of a whole system of metaphysics; because, regarding the first point, in a priori cognition nothing can be ascribed to the objects except what the thinking subject takes out of itself, and regarding the second, pure speculative reason is, in respect of principles of cognition, a unity entirely separate and subsisting for itself, in which, as in an organized body, every part exists for the sake of all the others as all the others exist for its sake, and no principle! can be taken with certainty in one relation unless it has at the same time been investigated in its thoroughgoing relation to the entire use of pure reason. But then metaphysics also has the rare good fortune, enjoyed by no other rational science that has to do with objects (for logic deals only with the form of thinking in general), which is that if by this critique it has been brought onto the secure course of a science, then it can fully embrace the entire field of cognitions belonging to it and thus can complete its work and lay it down for posterity as a principal framework that can never be enlarged, since it has to do solely with principles and the limitations on their use, which are determined by the principles themselves. Hence as a fundamental science, metaphysics is also bound to achieve this completeness, and we must be able to say of it: nil actum reputans, si quid superesset agendum [Thinking nothing done if something more is to be done].

Summary

The science critique of pure reason seeks to reground metaphysics using the success of mathematics and natural science as a guide. The result will not be the doctrine of metaphysics itself but an account of the new method of metaphysics as well as a description of the limits of our cognitions which bind all sciences, including metaphysics. Metaphysics can be completed since it only has to concern itself with principles contained within our own faculties and only those principles which contribute to cognitions a priori.

Commentary

Many readers of metaphysics expect philosophers to argue for and against positions: does God exist? are humans free? However, because critique of pure reason is a consideration of method Kant does not enter into these philosophical debates directly, instead the new method alters our relationship to these debates. The work of the Critique consists in understanding the structure and limitations of our a priori cognitions and how these limits determine the extent of any answers we may give to metaphysical problems. In order to understand our cognitive limits Kant first considers the a priori elements that we contribute to cognition, such as the forms of sensible intuition (e.g., time) and pure concepts (e.g., cause and effect). Because these elements are a priori they are all drawn from our own resources. In the work, these elements are found to be valid only when employed in relation to experience. Because of this, the truth of propositions about God, the soul, etc., are found to be inaccessible for us.

A second point of interest here regards the possibility of the completeness of metaphysics. Logic could attain completeness because it only concerns the form of thinking and so the diversity of thoughts does not enlarge this science. On the other hand, mathematics constructs its own concepts for study and can continue constructing new material indefinitely which prevents mathematics from attaining completeness. Similarly, natural science derives concepts from experience which always provides new material as well as an opportunity to detect shortcomings in our concepts. Metaphysics is not a merely formal science like logic, but it does not construct its concepts nor does it derive them from experiences. The concepts metaphysics deals with are finite in number and all concern themselves with completing a series of judgments produced by our particular form of experiencing. This view of metaphysics will be justified in the critique.

Questions

Is the Critique of Pure Reason still metaphysics?

Yes. Kant considers the science of critique to be a groundlaying phase for metaphysics in a new form; Kant even refers to it as a "metaphysics of metaphysics." Also, the Critique of Pure Reason doesn't complete the science of critique, as this completed science should contain all a priori concepts, while the Critique of Pure Reason only considers those that are required in the production of possible experience.

Terminology

speculative reason (spekulativen Vernunft), system of science (System der Wissenschaft), method (Methode), completeness (Vollständigkeit)

B xviii - xxii, ¶ 12

 Text

[¶12] This experiment succeeds as well as we could wish, and it promises to metaphysics the secure course of a science in its first part, where it concerns itself with concepts a priori to which the corresponding objects appropriate to them can be given in experience. For after this alteration in our way of thinking we can very well explain the possibility of a cognition a priori, and what is still more, we can provide satisfactory proofs of the laws that are the a priori ground of nature, as the sum total of objects of experience - which were both impossible according to the earlier way of proceeding. But from this deduction of our faculty of cognizing a priori in the first part of metaphysics, there emerges a very strange result, and one that appears very disadvantageous to the whole purpose with which the second part of metaphysics concerns itself, namely that with this faculty we can never get beyond the boundaries of possible experience, which is nevertheless precisely the most essential occupation of this science. But herein lies just the experiment providing a checkup on the truth of the result of that first assessment of our rational cognition a priori, namely that such cognition reaches appearances only, leaving the thing in itself as something actual for itself but uncognized by us. For that which necessarily drives us to go beyond the boundaries of experience and all appearances is the unconditioned, which reason necessarily and with every right demands in things in themselves for everything that is conditioned, thereby demanding the series of conditions as something completed. Now if we find that on the assumption that our cognition from experience conforms to the objects as things in themselves, the unconditioned cannot be thought at all without contradiction, but that on the contrary, if we assume that our representation of things as they are given to us does not conform to these things as they are in themselves but rather that these objects as appearances conform to our way of representing, then the contradiction disappears; and consequently that the unconditioned must not be present in things insofar as we are acquainted with them (insofar as they are given to us), but rather in things insofar as we are not acquainted with them, as things in themselves: then this would show that what we initially assumed only as an experiment is well grounded.* Now after speculative reason has been denied all advance in this field of the supersensible, what still remains for us is to try whether there are not data in reason's practical data for determining that transcendent rational concept of the unconditioned, in such a way as to reach beyond the boundaries of all possible experience, in accordance with the wishes of metaphysics, cognitions a priori that are possible, but only from a practical standpoint. By such procedures speculative reason has at least made room for such an extension, even if it had to leave it empty; and we remain at liberty, in-deed we are called upon by reason to fill it if we can through practical data of reason.†

* This experiment of pure reason has much in common with what the chemists sometimes call the experiment of reduction, or more generally the synthetic procedure. The analysis of the metaphysician separated pure a priori knowledge into two very heterogeneous elements, namely those of the things as appearances and the things in themselves. The dialectic once again combines them, in unison with the necessary rational idea of the unconditioned, and finds that the unison will never come about except through that distinction, which is therefore the true one.

† In the same way, the central laws of the motion of the heavenly bodies established with certainty what Copernicus assumed at the beginning only as a hypothesis, and at the same time they proved the invisible force (of Newtonian attraction) that binds the universe which would have remained forever undiscovered if Copernicus had not ventured, in a manner contradictory to the senses yet true, to seek for the observed movements not in the objects of the heavens but in their observer. In this Preface I propose the transformation in our way of thinking presented in criticism merely as a hypothesis, analogous to that other hypothesis, only in order to draw our notice to the first attempts at such a transformation, which are always hypothetical, even though in the treatise itself it will be proved not hypothetically but rather apodictically from the constitution of our representations of space and time and from the elementary concepts of the understanding.

Summary

When we consider objects as conforming to our manner of representing them we find success in the first part of metaphysics (ontology) but the other parts (rational psychology, rational cosmology, and natural theology) must suffer limitations. Considered in this way, our theoretical cognitions are limited to objects of possible experience. However, reason still demands an absolute ground and this cannot be found in experience but only with respect to things in themselves. We may find a way to satisfy reason's demand in its practical (moral) employment rather than its theoretical employment concerning what exists.

Commentary

If one were only interested in what Kant generally concludes in the critique and what next steps there are for metaphysics, then the reader could stop at this passage. Kant will be concluding that our a priori cognitions of objects are only valid within possible experience. This means that any object that cannot be given in a possible experience cannot be known (e.g., God).

Apart from the limitation that we must suffer, we also learn that reason itself is behind our confusion so far as it seeks the unconditioned. Understanding what the unconditioned is may be helpful before addressing how this leads us into difficulties.

Everything we experience is finite and depends on other things. To be in such a way that your state is determined by something else is to be conditioned. For example, all objects are limited to a part of space, or everything that is produced has a cause. Because the conditioned object always has that which is conditioning it, experience is rich with possible questions (e.g., what is the cause of that?). When we look to experience to answer these questions the answers themselves are also conditioned which leads to further questions. By remaining within experience we extend our knowledge, but we never find any rest.

Our own faculty of reason pushes us to seek answers to our questions which are final. This requires that we have an answer that have no further conditions (e.g., a cause without a prior cause). Since all the answers we give remain within experience they are conditioned rather than unconditioned and so we are pushed to provide answers that employ concepts of objects that cannot be found in any experience at all. Some will see a demand to stay within the boundaries of experience and continue the series of conditions forever or until we can no longer answer while others will see it as necessary to provide closure and step beyond experience. A conflict between these two orientations emerges that goes a long way to explain why dogmatic metaphysics is such a constant science as well as the origin of its perennial problems, conflicts ,and solutions. However, there is hope for mediating between these two groups.

Kant points out that if we recognize a difference between appearances of objects and the things themselves we find that the two groups are actually speaking about different things which need not be in conflict with each other. That is, objects, as they appear to us, may very well have causes going back in an infinite regress, however, if we consider objects in themselves then there are no longer conditions of experience which demand this regress. Relieving this contradiction, however, is certainly not enough to take us any closer to having knowledge of anything beyond the boundaries of experience and so for this we will need an entirely different source of cognitions than the resources in experience. To this end Kant mentions reason's practical data, but does not yet explain what this is or how it may help.

Questions

How does metaphysics find a new direction?

Kant recognizes that we cannot determine the metaphysical questions we have positively with respect to how objects exist. However, we can consider our disposition towards answering these questions in particular ways and see if there is any place where our disposition necessitates us to particular answers. If we are necessitated to certain beliefs about metaphysical questions then these certainly can't count as knowledge, but we also cannot ignore them.

Recognizing ourselves as obliged is a kind of necessity that stands outside of the necessity of nature - even if we ought to do something it very well may never happen, but we ought to do it nonetheless. This necessitation of ourselves reveals a dimension of consideration of the self that also stands outside of nature: we consider ourselves as capable of freely bringing about what we ought to do, that is, we posit ourselves as possessing free will. On top of this posit of our freedom and in conjunction with how our moral interests develop, we have a starting point that provides a new direction for metaphysics.

Terminology

unconditioned (Unbedingte), practical (practische)

B xv - xviii, ¶ 11

 Text

[¶11] I should think that the examples of mathematics and natural science, which have become what they now are through a revolution brought about all at once, were remarkable enough that we might reflect on the essential element in the change in the ways of thinking that has been so advantageous to them, and, at least as an experiment, imitate it insofar as their analogy with metaphysics, as rational cognition, might permit. Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to find out something about them a priori through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility of an a priori cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects before they are given to us. This would be just like the first thoughts of Copernicus, who, when he did not make good progress in the explanation of the celestial motions if he assumed that the entire celestial host revolves around the observer, tried to see if he might not have greater success if he made the observer revolve and left the stars at rest. Now in metaphysics we can try in a similar way regarding the intuition of objects. If intuition has to conform to the constitution of the objects, then I do not see how we can know anything of them a priori; but if the object (as an object of the senses) conforms to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, then I can very well represent this possibility to myself. Yet because I cannot stop with these intuitions, if they are to become cognitions, but must refer them as representations to something as their object and determine this object through them, I can assume either that the concepts through which I bring about this determination also conform to the objects, and then I am once again in the same difficulty about how I could know anything about them a priori, or else I assume that the objects, or what is the same thing, the experience in which alone they can be cognized (as given ob- jects) conforms to those concepts, in which case I immediately see an easier way out of the difficulty, since experience itself is a kind of cognition requiring the understanding, whose rule I have to presuppose in myself before any object is given to me, hence a priori, which rule is expressed in concepts a priori, to which all objects of experience must therefore necessarily conform, and with which they must agree. As for objects insofar as they are thought merely through reason, and necessarily at that, but that (at least as reason thinks them) cannot be given in experience at all - the attempt to think them (for they must be capable of being thought) will provide a splendid touchstone of what we assume as the altered method of our way of thinking, namely that we can cognize of things a priori only what we ourselves have put into them.*

* This method, imitated from the method of those who study nature, thus consists in this: to seek the elements of pure reason in that which admits of being confirmed or refuted through an experiment. Now the propositions of pure reason, especially when they venture beyond all boundaries of possible experience, admit of no test by experiment with their objects (as in natural science): thus to experiment will be feasible only with concepts and principles that we assume a priori by arranging the latter so that the same objects can be considered from two different sides, on the one side as objects of the senses and the understanding for experience, and on the other side as objects that are merely thought at most for isolated reason striving beyond the bounds of experience. If we now find that there is agreement with the principle of pure reason when things are considered from this twofold standpoint, but that an unavoidable conflict of reason with itself arises with a single standpoint, then the experiment decides for the correctness of that distinction.

Summary

Metaphysics has so far remained passive with respect to its objects, trying to discover some formula whereby we can conform our thoughts to them. What if, as in natural science and mathematics, we are responsible for the structure or form of objects, and so this structure need not be guessed at but is judged by us a priori?

Commentary

This passage is known for introducing the Copernican turn, which is a reversal of expectations around the conformance between cognition and the object of cognition. This reversal also gives insight into how Kant's project differs from metaphysics that came before and how it analogizes our faculties with the secure sciences.

Kant understands metaphysics prior to critique as supposing that knowledge must conform to objects. This seems fitting since when we are in error we conform our judgments to the world rather than expecting the world to conform to us. However, up to this point in the preface, the topic has been the security of science and how these disciplines became secure only if there is an element of cognition that comes from us a priori acting as a frame or model. Kant intends his approach to metaphysics as an analog of the secure sciences concerning a priori cognitions. We frame, or organize, experience in advance and a primary element we contribute to experience in this framing is the object itself as a way of bringing appearances to a unity. The judgments that bring about this framing must be a priori since they do not depend upon experience and even first produce it.

Earlier metaphysicians assumed all knowledge must conform to objects in both a posteriori (empirical) and a priori judgments. On the other hand Kant maintains that our a posteriori judgments must conform to objects, but proposes that these objects are, as to their form, constructed by us. In short, the notion of an object - a representation of something external to representation - is introduced by us as a way of bringing unity to experience. A famous result of this is that we know objects so far as they appear to us, but we do not know them so far as they do not appear to us (i.e., we do now know things in themselves).

In this we can see reactions to figures such Locke and Leibniz who each aim to treat all cognitions as either stemming from experience (a posteriori) or from supreme principles (a priori) respectively. We can also see a reaction to Hume who would deny security to cognition generally, for example, by rejecting the notion of a necessary connection.

Questions

What are some examples of attempts to conform our thought to objects?

Conforming our thoughts to objects is an attempt to discover rather than construct an ontology (a study of the being of beings). Philosophers generally, including Kant, develop ontologies that recognize objects is intended independent of our thinking. However, this notion of a something independent of thinking (i.e., a representation of something external to representation) is itself a representation in us and which we must account for. Ontology only ever gets so far as communicating this representation of the object as independent. That is, when we communicate our ontology we are still just communicating a representation of objects, not the things themselves.

Beyond having ontologies philosophers demand that these ontologies are correct. If we suppose our thinking must conform to the objects, then to be correct we need some way of checking our representation of objects with the objects themselves. However, we cannot do this directly, for we only have our representations to observe and analyze while the object is considered to stand apart from these representations. In this position so we are left with two options: first, discerning the form of objects logically (through avoiding contradictions) and so indirectly making the limitations of our thinking to be the limitations of reality; or, second, we can try to derive the notion of an object from experience by looking around and seeing what characteristics seem universal, and so making the limitations of our experience of objects to be the limitations of reality. Both of these are problematic in that they never really reach a criteria of verification beyond our own limitations.

Kant still understands objects to be independent things, but wants to avoid incidentally limiting reality by our own cognitive faculties. However, recognizing that we are limited to the analysis of our own representations we can only provide an ontology that relates this form of an object to the manner in which we experience objects. Even if we construct the notion of the object ourselves we still intend this to be about something standing ourself of representation. However, now our ontology will concern how we naturally take our representations to relate to some reality which stands outside of representation.

Is Kant proposing that objects are illusory?

Kant is like most philosophers in recognizing that we intend objects as standing on their own outside of our representations of them, and so, in short, Kant does not take objects to be mere representations or illusory. Kant is proposing that while we represent objects as mind-independant this representation of that which is mind-independent is constructed by us.

Terminology

cognition (Erkenntnis), intuition (Anschauung), experience (Erfahrung)

B xvi-xv, ¶ 9-10

 Text

[¶9] Metaphysics - a wholly isolated speculative cognition of reason that elevates itself entirely above all instruction from experience, and that through mere concepts (not, like mathematics, through the application of concepts to intuition), where reason thus is supposed to be its own pupil - has up to now not been so favored by fate as to have been able to enter upon the secure course of a science, even though it is older than all other sciences, and would remain even if all the others were swallowed up by an all-consuming barbarism. For in it reason continuously gets stuck, even when it claims a priori insight (as it pretends) into those laws confirmed by the commonest experience. In metaphysics we have to retrace our path countless times, because we find that it does not lead where we want to go, and it is so far from reaching unanimity in the assertions of its adherents that it is rather a battlefield, and indeed one that appears to be especially determined for testing one's powers in mock combat; on this battlefield no combatant has ever gained the least bit of ground, nor has any been able to base any lasting possession on his victory. Hence there is no doubt that up to now the procedure of metaphysics has been a mere groping, and what is the worst, a groping among mere concepts.

[¶10] Now why is it that here the secure path of science still could not be found? Is it perhaps impossible? Why then has nature afflicted our reason with the restless striving for such a path, as if it were one of reason's most important occupations? Still more, how little cause have we to place trust in our reason if in one of the most important parts of our desire for knowledge it does not merely forsake us but even entices us with delusions and in the end betrays us! Or if the path has merely eluded us so far, what indications may we use that might lead us to hope that in renewed attempts we will be luckier than those who have gone before us?

Summary

Metaphysics has failed to become a secure science. It has constantly had to begin over again so that no advance has been made. However, if metaphysics were impossible, then we must wonder: why does our own nature seem to aim us in the direction of these problems?

Commentary

In this passage, metaphysics is both ridiculed and honored. On the one hand, metaphysics has failed as a science and is only suited for mock combat. Perhaps worst of all it is a science that deals merely in concepts that - unlike natural science or mathematics - cannot be exhibited anywhere: metaphysics seems to be a game for thought. On the other hand, metaphysics concerns problems that are of the highest moment for us, and so metaphysics is the oldest and most enduring science; it seems a product of our own nature calling out for answers. From this situation Kant faces a crisis: if metaphysics is really a dead end, then what can we say for ourselves since our very nature leads us down this blind alley? At some level, we cannot indict metaphysics without indicting the meaning of our existence.

While such a concern may seem to be merely motivating rhetoric for the critique, the consistency that this concern has with the type of solution Kant ultimately comes to give reason to believe it is not merely rhetoric. What if our own nature is subject to misinterpretation and our misunderstanding only shows itself later through contradictions that seem unavoidable? A paradigm shift resulting from a reinterpretation of our nature will be required to put us on the correct course. Kant's critique is designed to show the contradictions that have emerged naturally for us and present an option that avoids these issues. Furthermore, it will present a new option for interpreting our nature: that we are not meant to pursue knowledge of these metaphysical questions, but our nature is pushing us towards beliefs.

One more general note on the interpretation of our nature. This theme, which is akin to the maxim to "know thyself", contains an existentialist dimension of Kant. Here there is no grounding logical principle and instead one encounters a decision about the meaning of our lives that can change everything for us. Kant rarely works out these problems on the page, but it is worth pointing it out even just to show the limits of the scope of critical philosophy as well as to enable comparative philosophy that can deepen our insight (e.g., comparisons to Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, etc).

Terminology

speculative cognition of reason (spekulativen vernunfterkenntnis)

B xii-xiv, ¶ 7-8

Text

[¶7] It took natural science much longer to find the highway of science; for it is only about one and a half centuries since the suggestion of the ingenious Francis Bacon partly occasioned this discovery and partly further stimulated it, since one was already on its tracks - which discovery, therefore, can just as much be explained by a sudden revolution in the way of thinking. Here I will consider natural science only insofar as it is grounded on empirical principles.

[¶8] When Galileo rolled balls of a weight chosen by himself down an inclined plane, or when Torricelli made the air bear a weight that he had previously thought to be equal to that of a known column of water, or when in a later time Stahl changed metals into calx and then changed the latter back into metal by first removing something and then putting it back again,* a light dawned on all those who study nature. They comprehended that reason has insight only into what it itself produces according to its own design; that it must take the lead with principles for its judgments according to constant laws and compel nature to answer its questions, rather than letting nature guide its movements by keeping reason, as it were, in leading-strings; for otherwise accidental observations, made according to no previously designed plan, can never connect up into a necessary law, which is yet what reason seeks and requires. Reason, in order to be taught by nature, must approach nature with its principles in one hand, according to which alone the agreement among appearances can count as laws, and, in the other hand, the experiments thought out in accordance with these principles - yet in order to be instructed by nature not like a pupil, who has recited to him whatever the teacher wants to say, but like an appointed judge who compels witnesses to answer the questions he puts to them. Thus even physics owes the advantageous revolution in its way of thinking to the inspiration that what reason would not be able to know of itself and has to learn from nature, it has to seek in the latter (though not merely ascribe to it) in accordance with what reason itself puts into nature. This is how natural science was first brought to the secure course of a science after groping about for so many centuries.

* Here I am not following exactly the thread of the history of the experimental method, whose first beginnings are also not precisely known.

Summary

Natural science has also attained security as mathematics has by recognizing that progress can only be made by guiding or structuring observations in advance (a priori) rather than on the basis of chance perceptions. We can see this when looking at experiments within the study of nature.

Commentary

Natural science deploys concepts that are drawn from experience and must apply in experience while mathematics, on the other hand, constructs its concepts. Just as mathematics became secure by actively introducing its own principles, natural science's security is tied to our active participation in the process of knowing. This includes developing theories, hypotheses, and controls so we have a reference point that we understand in advance; these are so many elements of experiment and observation that we have not had to revise even as our knowledge of nature advances.

If we consider what Kant emphasizes in his examples, it is the active role that the scientists have in their experiments. We can certainly see that things fall, and even that things fall at different speeds (a feather falls relatively slowly), but if we do not experiment we cannot isolate what features are the cause of the difference in the rate objects fall. Kant means to emphasize this by mentioning Galileo's fabled experiment where there was an attempt to observe the movement of objects of different weights in a manner in which the weight of the objects was more likely to be the only contributing factor. If one didn't try to control the experiment, then any result we observe may not give us information since we don't know what things are kept the same or allowed to be different, and so we do not know what the different outcomes are tied to.

As the topic of natural science and nature arises here, it would be prudent to explain Kant's understanding of nature. Many modern readers, but not all, may have a tendency to think of natural science as studying nature as it is in itself. If this is the approach to the study of nature, then Kant would designate it as dogmatic metaphysics rather than natural science. Of course, modern physics is not dogmatic metaphysics and so cannot be a study of things in themselves. Just as in Kant, the study of nature is a study of objects so far as they can appear, directly or indirectly, so as to be observed. Our observations are possible because we are active - we run experiments, we have hypotheses and theories that anticipate what will happen, etc. An important takeaway from this is that in our model of natural science we design and apply the law to nature. It will be important to keep this aspect of the laws of nature in mind: we are the lawgivers in the sense that we design and apply the laws, and continue to adjust them as we are further instructed by experience.

Natural laws - or laws of any kind - are not observable per se: we can only observe singular or particular objects, while laws are universal and necessary. Instead, we observe the conformity of objects in nature to a law that we have given, or, in more general terms, we observe that our concept can be applied in experience. For example, we do not observe universal gravitation for the same reason we can't observe anything universal. However, we observe that objects conform to this law (our concept finds application in experience).

Kant will argue that any order of nature, and so all possible law for nature, is determined through the manner in which we construct experience. This is a point that will need to be developed further in the future, but which we should bear in mind.

The study of nature must not be confused with the study of things in themselves. Instead, the association we make with nature in Kant should be with the sum total of appearances. Appearances have a dimension that is provided from our sensible faculty, which is receptive, and which provides a relation we can think back to the object per se.

Questions

If we give the law to nature, how is it that natural science is discovered rather than invented?

The brief response to this is that even though we apply the law to nature, it isn't any law that will apply, ultimately we are looking around for something we can use to generally describe the behavior of nature which is considered something other than us. We may feel inclined to believe we are slowly approximating to the way nature is in itself, but we never leave the realm of appearances and the way we structure them so we never have an opportunity to see how close or far we have approached to knowing things themselves. It is always possible that nature, in itself, is completely lawless and that we provide any semblance of order we find in nature. However, whether nature in itself is ordered or not is a speculative proposition that exceeds our capacity.

Terminology

empirical principles (empirische Prinzipien)

B x-xii, ¶ 5-6

 Text

[¶5] Mathematics and physics are the two theoretical cognitions of reason that are supposed to determine their objects a priori, the former entirely purely, the latter at least in part purely but also following the standards of sources of cognition other than reason.

[¶6] Mathematics has, from the earliest times to which the history of human reason reaches, in that admirable people the Greeks, traveled the secure path of a science. Yet it must not be thought that it was as easy for it as for logic - in which reason has to do only with itself - to find that royal path, or rather itself to open it up; rather, I believe that mathematics was left groping about for a long time (chiefly among the Egyptians), and that its transformation is to be ascribed to a revolution, brought about by the happy inspiration of a single man in an attempt from which the road to be taken onward could no longer be missed, and the secure course of a science was entered on and prescribed for all time and to an infinite extent. The history of this revolution in the way of thinking - which was far more important than the discovery of the way around the famous Cape - and of the lucky one who brought it about, has not been preserved for us. But the legend handed down to us by Diogenes Laertius - who names the reputed inventor of the smallest elements of geometrical demonstrations, even of those that, according to common judgment, stand in no need of proof - proves that the memory of the alteration wrought by the discovery of this new path in its earliest footsteps must have seemed exceedingly important to mathematicians, and was thereby rendered unforgettable. A new light broke upon the first person who demonstrated the isosceles triangle (whether he was called "Thales" or had some other name). For he found that what he had to do was not to trace what he saw in this figure, or even trace its mere concept, and read off, as it were, from the properties of the figure; but rather that he had to produce the latter from what he himself thought into the object and presented (through construction) according to a priori concepts, and that in order to know something securely a priori he had to ascribe to the thing nothing except what followed necessarily from what he himself had put into it in accordance with its concept.

Summary

Mathematics and physics are also examples of disciplines attained security as sciences. Mathematics attained security by attending to the properties that we introduce, a priori, into our own judgments and from which the a priori necessity of the mathematical cognitions extends.

Commentary

After lengthy praise of the significance of the revolution in mathematics, Kant discusses a crucial aspect of math's success: the necessity of our judgments in mathematics rest on what we have contributed to the construction of their concepts.

Kant recognized that advances in sciences followed the recognition that we must guide our study rather than depend on experience to lead us on its own. When mathematics became a secure science it made use of general solutions to problems a proiri and left behind imprecise measures such as using precalculated charts to approximate answers. Perhaps most memorable are the advances of ancient Greek geometry which must be limited in dealing with shapes so far as we experience them, but can judge universally and with necessity with concepts of figures such as circles and triangles constructed by us in advance.

As an example we can consider the first proposition in Euclid's Elements: to construct an equilateral triangle upon a given line. The proof follows by constructing more figures whose properties we understand in advance, namely circles. Two circles are constructed both with their center upon different ends of the line and with radii equal to the length of the entire given line. Because we know that the radii of the circles are the same as each other, and the same as the line they are constructed upon, we can find the place these circles intersect and connect each end of the line to this intersection point. The purpose of all this is to point out how the geometer does not sit idle, but actively contributes not only constructions to the proof, but the concepts that allow for the necessity resulting judgment. (An example such as this can also be used to point out how the judgments in mathematics are synthetic.)

Questions

Does Kant take mathematics to have been invented?

Concerning the debate of whether mathematics is invented or discovered, Kant appears to be on the side of invention; Kant even calls all knowledge from the construction of concepts mathematical knowledge. A brief argument for this can be drawn from how mathematics could attain a secure status. Mathematics judges with necessity and so these judgments can never be a posterioiri, but always a priori. The concepts of mathematics may have been inspired by reflection on experience in many cases, but many of these could not have been drawn from experience. The pure concepts of mathematics also require no exhibition in experience for their validity, for example, I do not need to discover a perfect circle or equilateral triangle for my concept of a circle to find acceptance - even in the application to calculations in experience. These concepts would then either be innate or constructed. If they are innate we would not learn mathematics as much as become conscious of it in ourselves, but this is not so, therefore these concepts are constructed by us.

To the argument that because everyone agrees on mathematics it must be discovered rather than invented, Kant's response would seem to be this: an alternative for the consistency in the judgments of mathematicians is also through the commonality of the form of intuition through which the concepts are constructed. The agreement between the mathematicians doesn't imply some inherent a priori insight into the order of the universe, but ultimately a form of social agreement around having a common sense.

Terminology

theoretical cognitions of Reason (theoretische Erkentnisse der Vernunft), pure (rein)

B ix-x, ¶ 4

 Text

[¶4] Insofar as there is to be reason in these sciences, something in them must be cognized a priori, and this cognition can relate to its object in either of two ways, either merely determining the object and its concept (which must be given from elsewhere), or else also making the object actual. The former is theoretical, the latter practical cognition of reason. In both the pure part, the part in which reason determines its object wholly a priori, must be expounded all by itself, however much or little it may contain, and that part that comes from other sources must not be mixed up with it; for it is bad economy to spend blindly whatever comes in without being able later, when the economy comes to a standstill, to distinguish the part of the revenue that can cover the expenses from the part that must be cut.

Summary

Sciences always have a priori cognitions which either determine what an object is or actualize them (bring them into existence). Sciences that determine are theoretical while those that actualize are practical. Our task is to present the pure (a priori) parts of these rational cognitions without anything from experience mixed in.

Commentary

Contemporary readers often think of science as an empirical endeavor and so they wonder if Kant's insistence on a priori cognitions regard antiquated notions of sciences. An understanding of what is entailed by these a priori cognitions can help the reader understand how these apply now just as much as then.

Every object we encounter empirically (in experience) is singular or, if considered as one among a given group or class, a particular; we do not - and cannot - encounter universal objects per se, but we can think about objects in a universal manner. A concept is already required to encounter a particular because it is considered one among others, but through universal judgments we consider objects further than we can ever experience them. If sciences were completely empirical they would be restricted to considering individuals or, at best, the particulars we encounter. However, our sciences deal with the universal (e.g., concerning all of nature) and so they cannot be completely empirical.

As we experience the world we form empirical concepts with which we can talk about objects we have not yet encountered. For example, from the concept I form of a human I can imagine to myself some human I have never met, or anticipate things about humans that I may meet in the future. Here I have begun to employ my concept to guide my thoughts intentionally rather than reactively in response to whatever I happen to experience. Despite my concept of human being empirical, I still employ this concept a priori whenever I am using it to guide or orient myself outside of experience.

The technique of learning from experience by using concepts to frame our experience is observation. Observations are distinguished from mere perceptions precisely due to the guidance of a priori cognitions (e.g., theories, hypotheses). Through observation we can determine if a notion we have developed of nature in universal terms is violated by any particular occurrence by comparing the consequences of the theory we hold (a priori) and the results of an experiment which should express those consequences of the theory.

From the above we can note something about metaphysics: there are no experiences possible for the objects of metaphysics (i.e., soul, World, and God) and so there is nothing like an observation of these, and so no experimentation. With no way to test theories there is no way to decide among them except logically, and Kant has discussed (in the previous passage) how logic cannot be used to extend our knowledge except negatively, so the only way of eliminating metaphysical theories through general logic is to find a contradiction. In metaphysics, a priori cognitions are certainly being used, but not in the service of guiding us in experience, but completely detached from experience. Kant will determine that these kinds of a priori cognitions are not legitimate.

A final note here of some interest. Kant will employ this understanding of the sciences in modeling his view of our own faculties. A chief characteristic of a priori cognitions is that they are the result of something which we introduce, and so it is with the synthetic a priori judgments which frame our very experience: the coherence of experience is possible because we introduce this element. This topic will be considered further as we proceed.

Questions

How does mathematics avoid the same fate as metaphysics?

Mathematics may seem to be in a similar situation as metaphysics for where can we find a perfect circle in experience? However, Kant doesn't have any concern with mathematics as its concepts are constructed by us and tested also in constructs of our own. There will be more on this topic later.

How does this impact Kant's own proposed science: critique of pure reason?

Kant realizes that he must guide his investigation with concepts in advance; the discussions of pure forms of intuition (i.e., space and time) and pure concepts (i.e., categories), which will be presented in the earlier part of the text, are important primarily because they are necessary to guide critical investigations.

Terminology

theretical (theoretische), practical (praktische), cognitions (Erkentnis), object (object or Gegenstand)

B vii-ix, ¶ 2-3

Text

[¶2] That from the earliest times logic has traveled this secure course can be seen from the fact that since the time of Aristotle it has not had to go a single step backwards, unless we count the abolition of a few dispensable subtleties or the more distinct determination of its presentation, which improvements belong more to the elegance than to the security of that science. What is further remarkable about logic is that until now it has also been unable to take a single step forward, and therefore seems to all appearance to be finished and complete. For if some moderns have thought to enlarge it by interpolating psychological chapters about our different cognitive powers (about imagination, wit), or metaphysical chapters about the origin of cognition or the different kinds of certainty in accordance with the diversity of objects (about idealism, skepticism, etc.), or anthropological chapters about our prejudice (about their causes and remedies), then this proceeds only from their ignorance of the peculiar nature of this science. It is not an improvement but a deformation of the sciences when their boundaries are allowed to run over into one another; the boundaries of logic, however, are determined quite precisely by the fact that logic is the science that exhaustively presents and strictly proves nothing but the formal rules of all thinking (whether this thinking be empirical or a priori, whatever origin or object it may have, and whatever contingent or natural obstacles it may meet within our minds).

[¶3] For the advantage that has made it so successful logic has solely its own limitation to thank, since it is thereby justified in abstracting - is indeed obliged to abstract - from all objects of cognition and all the distinctions between them; and in logic, therefore, the understanding has to do with nothing further than itself and its own form. How much more difficult, naturally, must it be for reason to enter upon the secure path of a science if it does not have to do merely with itself, but has to deal with objects too; hence logic as a propadeutic constitutes only the outer courtyard, as it were, to the sciences; and when it comes to information, a logic may indeed be presupposed in judging about the latter, but its acquisition must be sought in the sciences properly and objectively so called.

Summary

Logic is a science that can stand as an exemplar of secure sciences: we observe that it has not needed to seek out new foundations and that it seems to be complete. Many presumed advances are actually deformities as they miss the fact that logic's security is due precisely to the way it has limited itself. Logic stands as a condition for all sciences.

Commentary

Logic is the first of three sciences Kant will reflect on to draw out why they have attained security. In logic's case, it attained not only security but completeness early on. Logic's clear limits and formal nature were important for its success but the central feature Kant will focus on regards the limits restricting the field of logic to the rules of any and all thinking.

The limits of a science are established by principles that frame the object of that science and allow us to anticipate what is inside or outside of those boundaries thereby allowing us to anticipate something about all objects we may encounter. Were one to lose this capacity to anticipate the object, then special consideration or observation would be impossible since one wouldn't know what to look at and in which manner it was to be appraised.

Having no limit simply makes science impossible. However, having a limit is not itself sufficient unless this limit is maintained. If a science had now this boundary and then later another, the relationship between the various items of knowledge contained therein would become dubious. Across Kant's work, there are many occasions where he emphasizes the confusion that results in metaphysics from not recognizing its limits and the critique is itself an attempt to establish these limits. One such example that we will spend time with later is how confusing appearances and things in themselves leads to a conflation of logic and ontology.

Before moving on to the completeness logic has attained, it is significant to note that all science should be considered as a priori in this respect: they all employ limitations to guide their investigations in advance of experience or otherwise provide themselves with their object a priori. These frames being employed a priori does not prevent them from having been developed out of empirical concepts, as with natural science, but is enough to allow us to abstract from experience and deal with the objects of a science a priori (without looking directly at them). This also does not mean that natural sciences, such as physics, do not make empirical observations but that these observations require an a priori framing, and also that we can employ our scientific examples on questions we construct and not only on phenomena we directly observe. More will be said on this when we discuss natural science as secure science.

The completeness that logic has attained is not possible for all sciences, but due to logic's formal nature, it attained this completeness early on. Natural science, since it deals with the material of experience, has an inexhaustible field to study, and so could never attain completeness. On the other hand, logic deals only with the form of thinking, and so as long as one has even a single thought to study whatever is essential to the form of thinking is already in reach.

Kant mentions that logic is the outer courtyard of the sciences. This does not concern the same topic of its security but is a reflection on logic's relation to other sciences. Logic is completely formal and contains principles that apply to all thought; this means that when applying it to some thought you can abstract from the material involved and only look at the structure. As the outer courtyard of science, logic is a condition for all thinking in the sciences (i.e., a negative condition) while not contributing any material for sciences to study; it is not an organon but a canon.

Questions

Does the existence of the mathematical logic of today contradict Kant?

What the word 'logic' evokes has not remained stable, but if we distinguish classical logic from mathematical logic we may find that we can have our cake and eat it, too. It doesn't seem that mathematical logic must be seen as extending or altering classical logic as a science of the rules of all thinking which Kant had in mind. Mathematical logic does investigate relations between propositions within a system, but these structures seem like they can be treated separately and perhaps suggest a subtly different object of study, but on this topic, I would hope for some help from my reader.

Terminology

logic (logik), secure (sichern), science (Wissenschaft)

B vii, ¶ 1

 Text

[¶1] Whether or not the treatment of the cognitions belonging to the con­cern of reason travels the secure course of a science is something which can soon be judged by its success. If after many preliminaries and preparations are made, a science gets stuck as soon as it approaches its end, or if in order to reach this end it must often go back and set out on a new path; or likewise if it proves impossible for the different cowork­ers to achieve unanimity as to the way in which they should pursue their common aim; then we may be sure that such a study is merely groping about, that it is still far from having entered upon the secure course of a science; and it is already a service to reason if we can possi­bly find that path for it, even if we have to give up as futile much of what was included in the end previously formed without deliberation.

Summary

There are many signs that reveal whether a science has become secure. We should see whether the science that pursues the interest of reason is secure and, if not, find the path required to secure it. If such a path is impossible we must limit the pretensions of that science so that such a path is possible.

Commentary

The A and B editions begin with a discussion of the failure of metaphysics but through different routes. In A, a description of the conflict produced by reason is given responsibility for the confusion of metaphysics. In B, sciences that have not attained security (e.g., metaphysics) are asked to submit to evaluation and possible limitations. A is a direct assessment of the situation of metaphysics and contains suggestions at what it will take to solve it. B seems to hesitate, taking an indirect route to build a warrant against metaphysics. However, in B, Kant's decision to evaluate the success of sciences as secure sciences helps to provide a valuable guide for understanding metaphysics and the work of the Critique.

In the Critique, secure science is a paradigm that any science should attain in order to be science. Prior to attaining this security, a science is in a sort of prototype stage. Some signs provided to indicate if a science is not secure are 1) if it has to constantly go back to the beginning or 2) the individuals involved in the science cannot work together. We can observe that the description of metaphysics in the A edition precisely fits this description of a science still 'groping about'. These characteristics negatively describe marks of secure sciences, which would have constant principles through which individuals work together. The pursuit or attainment of such principles describes a situation where a body of knowledge can itself be universal.

Metaphysics purports to be a science, and so the critique will need to determine how security may be possible for metaphysics, or if it is possible at all. Critique of pure reason is itself a science and will also need to seek its own security, and as this science is first proposed here we have to be concerned about it still being in a prototypal stage itself.

Questions

What are the "cognitions belonging to the concern of reason"?

Reason seeks the unconditioned (i.e., the absolute condition) for any condition. There are certain kinds of conditions that attain in every experience that reason will pursue to their completeness: 1) the relation of all representation to the subject, 2) the relationship of objects to each other, and 3) all relations taken together. The completion of these conditions is represented by metaphysics by three ideas: soul, World, and God. Dogmatic metaphysics inherently interprets the "cognitions belonging to the concern of reason" to concern the further determination of the objects of these ideas. In contrast, Kant will see the cognition of any object for these ideas as impossible and instead interprets reason as providing a schema with which we may organize our knowledge of experience.

Terminology

cognition (Erkenntnisse), reason (Vernunft), science (Wissenschaft)

A xix-xxii, ¶ 14-16

 Text

[¶14] It can, as it seems to me, be no small inducement for the reader to unite his effort with that of the author, when he has the prospect of carrying out, according to the outline given above, a great and important piece of work, and that in a complete and lasting way. Now metaphysics, according to the concepts we will give of it here, is the only one of all the sciences that may promise that little but unified effort, and that indeed in a short time, will complete it in such a way that nothing remains to posterity except to adapt it in a didactic manner to its intentions, yet without being able to add to its content in the least. For it is nothing but the inventory of all we possess through pure reason, ordered systematically. Nothing here can escape us, because what reason brings forth entirely out of itself cannot be hidden, but is brought to light by reason itself as soon as reason's common principle has been discovered. The perfect unity of this kind of cognition, and the fact that it arises solely out of pure concepts without any influence that would extend or increase it from experience or even particular intuition, which would lead to a determinate experience, make this unconditioned completeness not only feasible but also necessary. Tecum habita, et naris quam sit tibi curta supellex. ["Dwell in your own house, and you will know how simple your possessions are"] - Persius.

[¶15] Such a system of pure (speculative) reason I hope myself to deliver under the title Metaphysics of Nature, which will be not half so extensive but will be incomparably richer in content than this critique, which had first to display the sources and conditions of its possibility, and needed to clear and level a ground that was completely overgrown. Here I expect from my reader the patience and impartiality of a judge, but there I will expect the cooperative spirit and assistance of a fellow worker; for however completely the principles of the system may be expounded in the critique, the comprehensiveness of the system itself requires also that no derivative concepts should be lacking, which, however, cannot be estimated a priori in one leap, but must be gradually sought out; likewise, just as in the former the whole synthesis of concepts has been exhausted, so in the latter it would be additionally de­manded that the same thing should take place in respect of their analysis, which would be easy and more entertainment than labor.

[¶16] I have only a few more things to remark with respect to the book's printing. Since the beginning of the printing was somewhat delayed, I was able to see only about half the proof sheets, in which I have come upon a few printing errors, though none that confuse the sense except the one occurring at page [A] 379, fourth line from the bottom, where specific should be read in place of skeptical. The Antinomy of Pure Reason, from page [A] 425 to page [A] 461, is arranged in the manner of a table, so that everything belonging to the thesis always continues on the left side and what belongs to the antithesis on the right side, which I did in order to make it easier to compare proposition and counter-proposition with one another.

Summary

After the critique is established, Kant sees the completion of metaphysics as well within reach and hopes this may entice others to join his efforts. Kant himself plans to work on a Metaphysics of Nature to fill in other pure concepts that are not covered in the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant finishes the Preface with some housekeeping about this text.

Commentary

Philosophers often ask for others to join with them as co-workers, and this plea often seems to be ignored. I suspect that Kant's own plea isn't any more recognized or ignored, and I don't insist there is any more inherent reason to work alongside Kant than any other philosophers. However, I do think it is important to do as these thinkers say.

If we look at Kant's work as a whole in terms of the social efforts it promotes, we may see his interests as bound up with the success of humanity generally. His projects aim at a common ground for metaphysics, representative democracy, cosmopolitanism (human rights), the abolition of war, and universal religion. Kant even believes that the arrow of history points at these various ends. Therefore, when Kant suggests that he desires fellow workers we may do well to take this seriously. (Once more, taking Kant's plea for fellowship seriously shouldn't bar us from doing the same with any other philosophers.)

In this passage, we find a discussion of some benefits derived from the critique. In part, it amounts to a future collaboration aimed at completing metaphysics - a task that Kant doesn't think is particularly challenging. The more particular result is that we will have an inventory of the human faculties and the principles of these faculties. It isn't clear what value this may have, so it could be helpful to introduce a discussion on this.

From other texts, such as the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, we know that Kant is a proponent of the division of labor. Such a division has allowed for the individual disciplines to focus on their special problems and excel at them. If these disciplines cannot make their boundaries clear then conflicts, confusion, and error emerge that ultimately sap energy better used elsewhere. At times a confusion of this sort can bring about a complete subversion of a different pursuit. For example, we will see how the blind alley traveled by metaphysics leads to a general confusion within practical philosophy which is detrimental to any theory of morals. The inventory of principles delivered by the Critique of Pure Reason will help clarify the border disputes between the faculties of the human being and help bring them to the harmony they seem destined for. This harmony of the faculties - a recognition of their appropriate use - aims to bring about harmony among the metaphysicians and clear the air of the dust that has been kicked up in their endless fighting. The battlefield of metaphysics hasn't resulted in the advance of science but has rather hindered the ability of philosophers to contribute to society beyond the schools.

Kant's plan to complete a metaphysics of nature was never completed as he put the project off to work within moral philosophy, politics, and continued efforts in the critical philosophy. However, he did write the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science but unfortunately died while writing the Metaphysics of Nature proper.

Questions

Why does Kant think metaphysics is a project that is completable?

There are two things that seem required for something to be completable: first, it is finite, and, second, the principles that organize it are accessible. In the case of metaphysics, it deals with an object of finite complexity, namely, our own faculties, and also in a way that confines them to only their a priori employment. Were we to be concerned with the empirical study of our faculties, then there would certainly be an infinite amount of variation that we could potentially encounter. However, when dealing with only the a priori employment of our faculties we can expect to witness all of their effects continuously rather than having to hunt them out in diverse experiences. As for accessing the principles of metaphysics, this requires a focal point we can become aware of from which we can develop an understanding of the a priori use of our faculties. In the Critique of Pure Reason, the object of possible experience will serve as such a focal point.

Terminology

principles (Principien)

A xvii-xix, ¶ 13

 Text

[¶13] Finally, as regards clarity, the reader has a right to demand first discursive (logical) clarity, through concepts, but then also intuitive (aesthetic) clarity, through intuitions, that is, through examples or other illustrations in concreto. I have taken sufficient care for the former. That was essential to my undertaking but was also the contingent cause of the fact that I could not satisfy the second demand, which is less strict but still fair. In the progress of my labor I have been almost constantly undecided how to deal with this matter. Examples and illustrations always appeared necessary to me, and hence actually appeared in their proper place in my first draft. But then I looked at the size of my task and the many objects with which I would have to do, and I became aware that this alone, treated in a dry, merely scholastic manner, would suffice to fill an extensive work; thus I found it inadvisable to swell it further with examples and illustrations, which are necessary only for a popular aim, especially since this work could never be made suitable for popular use, and real experts in this science do not have so much need for things to be made easy for them; although this would always be agreeable, here it could also have brought with it something counter- productive. The Abbe Terrasson says that if the size of a book is measured not by the number of pages but by the time needed to understand it, then it can be said of many a book that it would be much shorter if it were not so short. But on the other hand, if we direct our view toward the intelligibility of a whole of speculative cognition that is wide-ranging and yet is connected in principle, we could with equal right say that many a book would have been much clearer if it had not been made quite so clear. For the aids to clarity help in the parts but often confuse in the whole, since the reader cannot quickly enough attain a survey of the whole; and all their bright colors paint over and make unrecognizable the articulation or structure of the system, which yet matters most when it comes to judging its unity and soundness.

Summary

Kant recognizes two sorts of clarity: 1) logical which consists in the explication of concepts required to understand; 2) intuitive/aesthetic which depends on examples to make material easier to digest. Kant finds logical clarity to be essential to his task while aesthetic clarity is less important as it tends to inflate the size of the work and introduce distractions.

Commentary

Kant has written a difficult book and it may be disheartening to see that he has not set himself the requirement of aesthetic clarity. However, there is an additional peculiarity of his not meeting this requirement: Kant suggests that he had a draft with examples but he decided to leave them out. From this it is possible to consider whether Kant actually found the addition of examples to be confusing, which is paradoxical. One suggestion Kant gives to this end is that it would have made the work longer and this would have made the whole of the text harder to grasp. This concern isn't without merit since Kant insists that many issues the reader may find with his philosophy in the parts will be resolved in the whole, and so he hopes that the reader can get a view of this whole more readily. Besides this, Kant mentioned another difficulty introduced by examples.

When one uses an example or illustration, it is most helpful to use an example that makes things more distinct than other examples. However, this may not be an option here. For a large portion of the Critique, Kant will establish the necessary elements or all experience (the grounds of the possibility of experience or structure of experience). In this situation, any example Kant uses will be about as helpful as any other. To illustrate this, consider what I could do if I required an example of a substance. Here I could pick any object represented in appearance. The accidental characteristics of whatever example I select could themselves become a distraction. Kant notes as much nearer to the end of this paragraph. So, perhaps where no particular examples seem better than others, examples are generally not helpful. This problem of examples is worth further exploration, and an aside here on my personal experience hosting discussions of Kant's practical philosophy may be interesting.

Anyone may disagree with the conclusion of an example and yet can agree on the form that the example takes. In Kant, the form of judgments is typically interrogated while the content is negligible. For example, so far as we are concerned with the form of moral judgments (i.e., universality, necessity), the examples must at least express this form. In the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant gives four examples. The specifics of the examples are not important, but these examples illustrate the use of the formula for categorical imperatives introduced just prior. Whether we agree with the conclusions of the examples isn't very important since we are meant to consider the form involved in these judgments and how they relate to the formula for the categorical imperative. However, in discussing these examples with others - particularly with new readers of Kant - the particular correctness of these examples is often the theme of the discussion rather than the formal topic which the examples serve. This is excusable in readers first trying to interpret a difficult text, but this does cause the discussion to pass over the formal theme. These very examples have always been a stumbling block for reading groups going through this text, and I wonder if more examples in the first critique would have led to similar issues. At any rate, if you are a first-time reader, it is best to take Kant's advice and try to attend to the whole of the system first while perhaps making a note of anything that seems unresolved as you go. Kant himself (in the work Conflict of the Faculties), reports that he makes a habit of reading books at least twice: once quickly to get a sense of the whole, then again more slowly.

Questions

Is Kant's draft with examples available?

If anyone has any information on existing drafts please share in the comments.

What is popular use?

Kant mentions that the Critique is not suitable for popular use. This is often read as suggesting that the Critique couldn't have a popular audience. On this count, Kant would be wrong as the readership of the Critique of Pure Reason certainly extends beyond the metaphysicians constituting his original audience. However, the Critique not having popular use should also suggest that there is nothing that the text informs us about regarding our day-to-day affairs. This point is arguable. The themes of the text certainly don't aim at any daily employment, but perhaps what one learns about oneself through the text could change the relationship we have too many of our daily activities. What popular use the work may have may be best for the reader to ultimately decide, but we can appreciate Kant doesn't seek to write something that immediately addresses daily life.

Terminology

clarity (Deutlichkeit), popular (populärer)

A xv-xvii, ¶ 10-12

Text

[¶10] Furthermore certainty and clarity, two things that concern the form of the investigation, are to be viewed as essential demands, which may rightly be made on the author who ventures upon so slippery an undertaking.

[¶11] As far as certainty is concerned, I have myself pronounced the judgment that in this kind of inquiry it is in no way allowed to hold opinions, and that anything that even looks like an hypothesis is a forbidden commodity, which should not be put up for sale even at the lowest price but must be confiscated as soon as it is discovered. For every cognition that is supposed to be certain a priori proclaims that it wants to be held for absolutely necessary, and even more is this true of a determination of all pure cognitions a priori, which is to be the standard and thus even the example of all apodictic (philosophical) certainty. Whether I have performed what I have just pledged in that respect remains wholly to the judgment of the reader, since it is appropriate for an author only to present the grounds, but not to judge about their effect on his judges. But in order that he should not inadvertently be the cause of weakening his own arguments, the author may be permitted to note himself those places that, even though they pertain only to the incidental end of the work, may be the occasion for some mistrust, in order that he may in a timely manner counteract the influence that even the reader's slightest reservation on this point may have on his judgment over the chief end.

[¶12] I am acquainted with no investigations more important for getting to the bottom of that faculty we call the understanding, and at the same time for the determination of the rules and boundaries of its use, than those I have undertaken in the second chapter of the Transcendental Analytic, under the title Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding; they are also the investigations that have cost me the most, but I hope not unrewarded, effort. This inquiry, which goes rather deep, has two sides. One side refers to the objects of the pure understanding, and is supposed to demonstrate and make comprehensible the objective validity of its concepts a priori; thus it belongs essentially to my ends. The other side deals with the pure understanding itself, concerning its possibility and the powers of cognition on which it itself rests; thus it considers it in a subjective relation, and although this exposition is of great importance in respect of my chief end, it does not belong essentially to it; because the chief question always remains: "What and how much can understanding and reason cognize free of all experience?" and not: "How is the faculty of thinking itself possible?" Since the latter question is something like the search for the cause of a given effect, and is therefore something like a hypothesis (although, as I will elsewhere take the opportunity to show, this is not in fact how matters stand), it appears as if I am taking the liberty in this case of expressing an opinion, and that the reader might therefore be free to hold another opinion. In view of this I must remind the reader in advance that even in case my subjective deduction does not produce the complete conviction that I expect, the objective deduction that is my primary concern would come into its full strength, on which what is said at pages [A] 92-3 should even be sufficient by itself.

Summary

Regarding certainty (clarity is dealt with next): one cannot hold opinions or hypotheses as apodictic judgments, and since the Critique concerns apodictic judgments it is also banned from opinions or hypotheses. Kant is concerned the reader may misunderstand the deduction by believing it to be a hypothesis or opinion when it is really trying to express an apodictic judgment central to the grounding of the critique. The deduction does has an objective part (A92-3), which is said to be of essential importance, as well as a subjective part is important but apparently not essential.

Commentary

Many readers may find Kant's pursuit of certainty to be arbitrary and a reflection of some personal need, but it is important to note how the demand for certainty comes from the nature of the project being pursued. The critique, since it concerns "the standard and thus even the example of all apodictic (philosophical) certainty" must pursue its topics purely a priori. In these circumstances, one can only make a judgment if one can demonstrate that there are no other options. If there are other options, then there would be no sufficient (a priori) objective grounds for any of the options and so there would only be room for belief or opinion. Were Kant to depend upon arguments grounded in his opinion, then, lacking objective grounds, it would be unlikely that the community he is writing for would be able to judge or participate in the critical project. So, certainty isn't something Kant seeks arbitrarily, but is crucial for a project that excplicitly is soliciting a community to join him. There is a useful aside to be made here about the role of community in Kant's thought.

Kant presupposes certain agreements with the audience, and these play a crucial role in framing and justifying Kant's thought. For example, it is assumed that we are in possession of mathemtics and natural science, and that we are unwilling to give these sciences up. Kant uses the necessity found in these sciences as footholds, and were we willing to give these up, Kant's argument would collapse. The necessity of the sciences is only possible if we posit certain faculties of our mind, and Kant wants to describe just those elements required. Moments where Kant relies on these common agreements will be pointed out as they arise.

*       *       *

Kant tells us that the objective deduction is most essential and also where to find it (i.e., A92-3). This objective deduction is given in a single paragraph which remained unchanged between the A and B editions, while the so-called subjective deduction was completely reworked. The difference between objective and subjective generally will need to be covered elsewhere, but here it is sufficient to see how Kant characterizes these two deductions. The objective deduction regards the aim of critique that we have already seen: the extent of our cognitions a priori, while the subjective deduction concerns the possibility of our thinking. These two questions are linked to each other since the problem of the extent of our cognition, when answered, allows us to recognize what powers we must assume in ourselves (so that we are equal to ourselves).

Questions

Why is certainty a concern for the form of the investigation and not the content?

It is typical to consider certainty as a quality of contents, for example, that they are undoubtable so it is unclear how they have to do with form. Towards understanding this, a hint in the text comes from how hypotheses and opinions are banned from the critique. Kant discusses opinions in the Critique (as well as in lectures) alongside belief and knowledge as differing depending upon the relationship of grounds for our judgment. If there are grounds we are conscious of then holding-to-be-true will be either knowledge or belief, while if there are no grounds we are conscious of then we will only have an opinion. From this it seems that the form of the discussion Kant will give requires that we become conscious of the grounds for the judgments that he makes, and he cannot make arbitrary assertions. Opinions lack grounds of any sort, so regardless of the content expressing opinions will always lack this form (the relation between the grounds and the holding-to-be-true).

Terminology

certainty (Geweißheit), a priori, deduction (Deduktion), form (Form), opinion (meinung), hypothesis (Hypotheses)