B ix-x, ¶ 4

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[¶4] Insofar as there is to be reason in these sciences, something in them must be cognized a priori, and this cognition can relate to its object in either of two ways, either merely determining the object and its concept (which must be given from elsewhere), or else also making the object actual. The former is theoretical, the latter practical cognition of reason. In both the pure part, the part in which reason determines its object wholly a priori, must be expounded all by itself, however much or little it may contain, and that part that comes from other sources must not be mixed up with it; for it is bad economy to spend blindly whatever comes in without being able later, when the economy comes to a standstill, to distinguish the part of the revenue that can cover the expenses from the part that must be cut.

Summary

Sciences always have a priori cognitions which either determine what an object is or actualize them (bring them into existence). Sciences that determine are theoretical while those that actualize are practical. Our task is to present the pure (a priori) parts of these rational cognitions without anything from experience mixed in.

Commentary

Contemporary readers often think of science as an empirical endeavor and so they wonder if Kant's insistence on a priori cognitions regard antiquated notions of sciences. An understanding of what is entailed by these a priori cognitions can help the reader understand how these apply now just as much as then.

Every object we encounter empirically (in experience) is singular or, if considered as one among a given group or class, a particular; we do not - and cannot - encounter universal objects per se, but we can think about objects in a universal manner. A concept is already required to encounter a particular because it is considered one among others, but through universal judgments we consider objects further than we can ever experience them. If sciences were completely empirical they would be restricted to considering individuals or, at best, the particulars we encounter. However, our sciences deal with the universal (e.g., concerning all of nature) and so they cannot be completely empirical.

As we experience the world we form empirical concepts with which we can talk about objects we have not yet encountered. For example, from the concept I form of a human I can imagine to myself some human I have never met, or anticipate things about humans that I may meet in the future. Here I have begun to employ my concept to guide my thoughts intentionally rather than reactively in response to whatever I happen to experience. Despite my concept of human being empirical, I still employ this concept a priori whenever I am using it to guide or orient myself outside of experience.

The technique of learning from experience by using concepts to frame our experience is observation. Observations are distinguished from mere perceptions precisely due to the guidance of a priori cognitions (e.g., theories, hypotheses). Through observation we can determine if a notion we have developed of nature in universal terms is violated by any particular occurrence by comparing the consequences of the theory we hold (a priori) and the results of an experiment which should express those consequences of the theory.

From the above we can note something about metaphysics: there are no experiences possible for the objects of metaphysics (i.e., soul, World, and God) and so there is nothing like an observation of these, and so no experimentation. With no way to test theories there is no way to decide among them except logically, and Kant has discussed (in the previous passage) how logic cannot be used to extend our knowledge except negatively, so the only way of eliminating metaphysical theories through general logic is to find a contradiction. In metaphysics, a priori cognitions are certainly being used, but not in the service of guiding us in experience, but completely detached from experience. Kant will determine that these kinds of a priori cognitions are not legitimate.

A final note here of some interest. Kant will employ this understanding of the sciences in modeling his view of our own faculties. A chief characteristic of a priori cognitions is that they are the result of something which we introduce, and so it is with the synthetic a priori judgments which frame our very experience: the coherence of experience is possible because we introduce this element. This topic will be considered further as we proceed.

Questions

How does mathematics avoid the same fate as metaphysics?

Mathematics may seem to be in a similar situation as metaphysics for where can we find a perfect circle in experience? However, Kant doesn't have any concern with mathematics as its concepts are constructed by us and tested also in constructs of our own. There will be more on this topic later.

How does this impact Kant's own proposed science: critique of pure reason?

Kant realizes that he must guide his investigation with concepts in advance; the discussions of pure forms of intuition (i.e., space and time) and pure concepts (i.e., categories), which will be presented in the earlier part of the text, are important primarily because they are necessary to guide critical investigations.

Terminology

theretical (theoretische), practical (praktische), cognitions (Erkentnis), object (object or Gegenstand)

B vii-ix, ¶ 2-3

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[¶2] That from the earliest times logic has traveled this secure course can be seen from the fact that since the time of Aristotle it has not had to go a single step backwards, unless we count the abolition of a few dispensable subtleties or the more distinct determination of its presentation, which improvements belong more to the elegance than to the security of that science. What is further remarkable about logic is that until now it has also been unable to take a single step forward, and therefore seems to all appearance to be finished and complete. For if some moderns have thought to enlarge it by interpolating psychological chapters about our different cognitive powers (about imagination, wit), or metaphysical chapters about the origin of cognition or the different kinds of certainty in accordance with the diversity of objects (about idealism, skepticism, etc.), or anthropological chapters about our prejudice (about their causes and remedies), then this proceeds only from their ignorance of the peculiar nature of this science. It is not an improvement but a deformation of the sciences when their boundaries are allowed to run over into one another; the boundaries of logic, however, are determined quite precisely by the fact that logic is the science that exhaustively presents and strictly proves nothing but the formal rules of all thinking (whether this thinking be empirical or a priori, whatever origin or object it may have, and whatever contingent or natural obstacles it may meet within our minds).

[¶3] For the advantage that has made it so successful logic has solely its own limitation to thank, since it is thereby justified in abstracting - is indeed obliged to abstract - from all objects of cognition and all the distinctions between them; and in logic, therefore, the understanding has to do with nothing further than itself and its own form. How much more difficult, naturally, must it be for reason to enter upon the secure path of a science if it does not have to do merely with itself, but has to deal with objects too; hence logic as a propadeutic constitutes only the outer courtyard, as it were, to the sciences; and when it comes to information, a logic may indeed be presupposed in judging about the latter, but its acquisition must be sought in the sciences properly and objectively so called.

Summary

Logic is a science that can stand as an exemplar of secure sciences: we observe that it has not needed to seek out new foundations and that it seems to be complete. Many presumed advances are actually deformities as they miss the fact that logic's security is due precisely to the way it has limited itself. Logic stands as a condition for all sciences.

Commentary

Logic is the first of three sciences Kant will reflect on to draw out why they have attained security. In logic's case, it attained not only security but completeness early on. Logic's clear limits and formal nature were important for its success but the central feature Kant will focus on regards the limits restricting the field of logic to the rules of any and all thinking.

The limits of a science are established by principles that frame the object of that science and allow us to anticipate what is inside or outside of those boundaries thereby allowing us to anticipate something about all objects we may encounter. Were one to lose this capacity to anticipate the object, then special consideration or observation would be impossible since one wouldn't know what to look at and in which manner it was to be appraised.

Having no limit simply makes science impossible. However, having a limit is not itself sufficient unless this limit is maintained. If a science had now this boundary and then later another, the relationship between the various items of knowledge contained therein would become dubious. Across Kant's work, there are many occasions where he emphasizes the confusion that results in metaphysics from not recognizing its limits and the critique is itself an attempt to establish these limits. One such example that we will spend time with later is how confusing appearances and things in themselves leads to a conflation of logic and ontology.

Before moving on to the completeness logic has attained, it is significant to note that all science should be considered as a priori in this respect: they all employ limitations to guide their investigations in advance of experience or otherwise provide themselves with their object a priori. These frames being employed a priori does not prevent them from having been developed out of empirical concepts, as with natural science, but is enough to allow us to abstract from experience and deal with the objects of a science a priori (without looking directly at them). This also does not mean that natural sciences, such as physics, do not make empirical observations but that these observations require an a priori framing, and also that we can employ our scientific examples on questions we construct and not only on phenomena we directly observe. More will be said on this when we discuss natural science as secure science.

The completeness that logic has attained is not possible for all sciences, but due to logic's formal nature, it attained this completeness early on. Natural science, since it deals with the material of experience, has an inexhaustible field to study, and so could never attain completeness. On the other hand, logic deals only with the form of thinking, and so as long as one has even a single thought to study whatever is essential to the form of thinking is already in reach.

Kant mentions that logic is the outer courtyard of the sciences. This does not concern the same topic of its security but is a reflection on logic's relation to other sciences. Logic is completely formal and contains principles that apply to all thought; this means that when applying it to some thought you can abstract from the material involved and only look at the structure. As the outer courtyard of science, logic is a condition for all thinking in the sciences (i.e., a negative condition) while not contributing any material for sciences to study; it is not an organon but a canon.

Questions

Does the existence of the mathematical logic of today contradict Kant?

What the word 'logic' evokes has not remained stable, but if we distinguish classical logic from mathematical logic we may find that we can have our cake and eat it, too. It doesn't seem that mathematical logic must be seen as extending or altering classical logic as a science of the rules of all thinking which Kant had in mind. Mathematical logic does investigate relations between propositions within a system, but these structures seem like they can be treated separately and perhaps suggest a subtly different object of study, but on this topic, I would hope for some help from my reader.

Terminology

logic (logik), secure (sichern), science (Wissenschaft)

B vii, ¶ 1

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[¶1] Whether or not the treatment of the cognitions belonging to the con­cern of reason travels the secure course of a science is something which can soon be judged by its success. If after many preliminaries and preparations are made, a science gets stuck as soon as it approaches its end, or if in order to reach this end it must often go back and set out on a new path; or likewise if it proves impossible for the different cowork­ers to achieve unanimity as to the way in which they should pursue their common aim; then we may be sure that such a study is merely groping about, that it is still far from having entered upon the secure course of a science; and it is already a service to reason if we can possi­bly find that path for it, even if we have to give up as futile much of what was included in the end previously formed without deliberation.

Summary

There are many signs that reveal whether a science has become secure. We should see whether the science that pursues the interest of reason is secure and, if not, find the path required to secure it. If such a path is impossible we must limit the pretensions of that science so that such a path is possible.

Commentary

The A and B editions begin with a discussion of the failure of metaphysics but through different routes. In A, a description of the conflict produced by reason is given responsibility for the confusion of metaphysics. In B, sciences that have not attained security (e.g., metaphysics) are asked to submit to evaluation and possible limitations. A is a direct assessment of the situation of metaphysics and contains suggestions at what it will take to solve it. B seems to hesitate, taking an indirect route to build a warrant against metaphysics. However, in B, Kant's decision to evaluate the success of sciences as secure sciences helps to provide a valuable guide for understanding metaphysics and the work of the Critique.

In the Critique, secure science is a paradigm that any science should attain in order to be science. Prior to attaining this security, a science is in a sort of prototype stage. Some signs provided to indicate if a science is not secure are 1) if it has to constantly go back to the beginning or 2) the individuals involved in the science cannot work together. We can observe that the description of metaphysics in the A edition precisely fits this description of a science still 'groping about'. These characteristics negatively describe marks of secure sciences, which would have constant principles through which individuals work together. The pursuit or attainment of such principles describes a situation where a body of knowledge can itself be universal.

Metaphysics purports to be a science, and so the critique will need to determine how security may be possible for metaphysics, or if it is possible at all. Critique of pure reason is itself a science and will also need to seek its own security, and as this science is first proposed here we have to be concerned about it still being in a prototypal stage itself.

Questions

What are the "cognitions belonging to the concern of reason"?

Reason seeks the unconditioned (i.e., the absolute condition) for any condition. There are certain kinds of conditions that attain in every experience that reason will pursue to their completeness: 1) the relation of all representation to the subject, 2) the relationship of objects to each other, and 3) all relations taken together. The completion of these conditions is represented by metaphysics by three ideas: soul, World, and God. Dogmatic metaphysics inherently interprets the "cognitions belonging to the concern of reason" to concern the further determination of the objects of these ideas. In contrast, Kant will see the cognition of any object for these ideas as impossible and instead interprets reason as providing a schema with which we may organize our knowledge of experience.

Terminology

cognition (Erkenntnisse), reason (Vernunft), science (Wissenschaft)

A xix-xxii, ¶ 14-16

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[¶14] It can, as it seems to me, be no small inducement for the reader to unite his effort with that of the author, when he has the prospect of carrying out, according to the outline given above, a great and important piece of work, and that in a complete and lasting way. Now metaphysics, according to the concepts we will give of it here, is the only one of all the sciences that may promise that little but unified effort, and that indeed in a short time, will complete it in such a way that nothing remains to posterity except to adapt it in a didactic manner to its intentions, yet without being able to add to its content in the least. For it is nothing but the inventory of all we possess through pure reason, ordered systematically. Nothing here can escape us, because what reason brings forth entirely out of itself cannot be hidden, but is brought to light by reason itself as soon as reason's common principle has been discovered. The perfect unity of this kind of cognition, and the fact that it arises solely out of pure concepts without any influence that would extend or increase it from experience or even particular intuition, which would lead to a determinate experience, make this unconditioned completeness not only feasible but also necessary. Tecum habita, et naris quam sit tibi curta supellex. ["Dwell in your own house, and you will know how simple your possessions are"] - Persius.

[¶15] Such a system of pure (speculative) reason I hope myself to deliver under the title Metaphysics of Nature, which will be not half so extensive but will be incomparably richer in content than this critique, which had first to display the sources and conditions of its possibility, and needed to clear and level a ground that was completely overgrown. Here I expect from my reader the patience and impartiality of a judge, but there I will expect the cooperative spirit and assistance of a fellow worker; for however completely the principles of the system may be expounded in the critique, the comprehensiveness of the system itself requires also that no derivative concepts should be lacking, which, however, cannot be estimated a priori in one leap, but must be gradually sought out; likewise, just as in the former the whole synthesis of concepts has been exhausted, so in the latter it would be additionally de­manded that the same thing should take place in respect of their analysis, which would be easy and more entertainment than labor.

[¶16] I have only a few more things to remark with respect to the book's printing. Since the beginning of the printing was somewhat delayed, I was able to see only about half the proof sheets, in which I have come upon a few printing errors, though none that confuse the sense except the one occurring at page [A] 379, fourth line from the bottom, where specific should be read in place of skeptical. The Antinomy of Pure Reason, from page [A] 425 to page [A] 461, is arranged in the manner of a table, so that everything belonging to the thesis always continues on the left side and what belongs to the antithesis on the right side, which I did in order to make it easier to compare proposition and counter-proposition with one another.

Summary

After the critique is established, Kant sees the completion of metaphysics as well within reach and hopes this may entice others to join his efforts. Kant himself plans to work on a Metaphysics of Nature to fill in other pure concepts that are not covered in the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant finishes the Preface with some housekeeping about this text.

Commentary

Philosophers often ask for others to join with them as co-workers, and this plea often seems to be ignored. I suspect that Kant's own plea isn't any more recognized or ignored, and I don't insist there is any more inherent reason to work alongside Kant than any other philosophers. However, I do think it is important to do as these thinkers say.

If we look at Kant's work as a whole in terms of the social efforts it promotes, we may see his interests as bound up with the success of humanity generally. His projects aim at a common ground for metaphysics, representative democracy, cosmopolitanism (human rights), the abolition of war, and universal religion. Kant even believes that the arrow of history points at these various ends. Therefore, when Kant suggests that he desires fellow workers we may do well to take this seriously. (Once more, taking Kant's plea for fellowship seriously shouldn't bar us from doing the same with any other philosophers.)

In this passage, we find a discussion of some benefits derived from the critique. In part, it amounts to a future collaboration aimed at completing metaphysics - a task that Kant doesn't think is particularly challenging. The more particular result is that we will have an inventory of the human faculties and the principles of these faculties. It isn't clear what value this may have, so it could be helpful to introduce a discussion on this.

From other texts, such as the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, we know that Kant is a proponent of the division of labor. Such a division has allowed for the individual disciplines to focus on their special problems and excel at them. If these disciplines cannot make their boundaries clear then conflicts, confusion, and error emerge that ultimately sap energy better used elsewhere. At times a confusion of this sort can bring about a complete subversion of a different pursuit. For example, we will see how the blind alley traveled by metaphysics leads to a general confusion within practical philosophy which is detrimental to any theory of morals. The inventory of principles delivered by the Critique of Pure Reason will help clarify the border disputes between the faculties of the human being and help bring them to the harmony they seem destined for. This harmony of the faculties - a recognition of their appropriate use - aims to bring about harmony among the metaphysicians and clear the air of the dust that has been kicked up in their endless fighting. The battlefield of metaphysics hasn't resulted in the advance of science but has rather hindered the ability of philosophers to contribute to society beyond the schools.

Kant's plan to complete a metaphysics of nature was never completed as he put the project off to work within moral philosophy, politics, and continued efforts in the critical philosophy. However, he did write the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science but unfortunately died while writing the Metaphysics of Nature proper.

Questions

Why does Kant think metaphysics is a project that is completable?

There are two things that seem required for something to be completable: first, it is finite, and, second, the principles that organize it are accessible. In the case of metaphysics, it deals with an object of finite complexity, namely, our own faculties, and also in a way that confines them to only their a priori employment. Were we to be concerned with the empirical study of our faculties, then there would certainly be an infinite amount of variation that we could potentially encounter. However, when dealing with only the a priori employment of our faculties we can expect to witness all of their effects continuously rather than having to hunt them out in diverse experiences. As for accessing the principles of metaphysics, this requires a focal point we can become aware of from which we can develop an understanding of the a priori use of our faculties. In the Critique of Pure Reason, the object of possible experience will serve as such a focal point.

Terminology

principles (Principien)