B xviii - xxii, ¶ 12

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[¶12] This experiment succeeds as well as we could wish, and it promises to metaphysics the secure course of a science in its first part, where it concerns itself with concepts a priori to which the corresponding objects appropriate to them can be given in experience. For after this alteration in our way of thinking we can very well explain the possibility of a cognition a priori, and what is still more, we can provide satisfactory proofs of the laws that are the a priori ground of nature, as the sum total of objects of experience - which were both impossible according to the earlier way of proceeding. But from this deduction of our faculty of cognizing a priori in the first part of metaphysics, there emerges a very strange result, and one that appears very disadvantageous to the whole purpose with which the second part of metaphysics concerns itself, namely that with this faculty we can never get beyond the boundaries of possible experience, which is nevertheless precisely the most essential occupation of this science. But herein lies just the experiment providing a checkup on the truth of the result of that first assessment of our rational cognition a priori, namely that such cognition reaches appearances only, leaving the thing in itself as something actual for itself but uncognized by us. For that which necessarily drives us to go beyond the boundaries of experience and all appearances is the unconditioned, which reason necessarily and with every right demands in things in themselves for everything that is conditioned, thereby demanding the series of conditions as something completed. Now if we find that on the assumption that our cognition from experience conforms to the objects as things in themselves, the unconditioned cannot be thought at all without contradiction, but that on the contrary, if we assume that our representation of things as they are given to us does not conform to these things as they are in themselves but rather that these objects as appearances conform to our way of representing, then the contradiction disappears; and consequently that the unconditioned must not be present in things insofar as we are acquainted with them (insofar as they are given to us), but rather in things insofar as we are not acquainted with them, as things in themselves: then this would show that what we initially assumed only as an experiment is well grounded.* Now after speculative reason has been denied all advance in this field of the supersensible, what still remains for us is to try whether there are not data in reason's practical data for determining that transcendent rational concept of the unconditioned, in such a way as to reach beyond the boundaries of all possible experience, in accordance with the wishes of metaphysics, cognitions a priori that are possible, but only from a practical standpoint. By such procedures speculative reason has at least made room for such an extension, even if it had to leave it empty; and we remain at liberty, in-deed we are called upon by reason to fill it if we can through practical data of reason.†

* This experiment of pure reason has much in common with what the chemists sometimes call the experiment of reduction, or more generally the synthetic procedure. The analysis of the metaphysician separated pure a priori knowledge into two very heterogeneous elements, namely those of the things as appearances and the things in themselves. The dialectic once again combines them, in unison with the necessary rational idea of the unconditioned, and finds that the unison will never come about except through that distinction, which is therefore the true one.

† In the same way, the central laws of the motion of the heavenly bodies established with certainty what Copernicus assumed at the beginning only as a hypothesis, and at the same time they proved the invisible force (of Newtonian attraction) that binds the universe which would have remained forever undiscovered if Copernicus had not ventured, in a manner contradictory to the senses yet true, to seek for the observed movements not in the objects of the heavens but in their observer. In this Preface I propose the transformation in our way of thinking presented in criticism merely as a hypothesis, analogous to that other hypothesis, only in order to draw our notice to the first attempts at such a transformation, which are always hypothetical, even though in the treatise itself it will be proved not hypothetically but rather apodictically from the constitution of our representations of space and time and from the elementary concepts of the understanding.

Summary

When we consider objects as conforming to our manner of representing them we find success in the first part of metaphysics (ontology) but the other parts (rational psychology, rational cosmology, and natural theology) must suffer limitations. Considered in this way, our theoretical cognitions are limited to objects of possible experience. However, reason still demands an absolute ground and this cannot be found in experience but only with respect to things in themselves. We may find a way to satisfy reason's demand in its practical (moral) employment rather than its theoretical employment concerning what exists.

Commentary

If one were only interested in what Kant generally concludes in the critique and what next steps there are for metaphysics, then the reader could stop at this passage. Kant will be concluding that our a priori cognitions of objects are only valid within possible experience. This means that any object that cannot be given in a possible experience cannot be known (e.g., God).

Apart from the limitation that we must suffer, we also learn that reason itself is behind our confusion so far as it seeks the unconditioned. Understanding what the unconditioned is may be helpful before addressing how this leads us into difficulties.

Everything we experience is finite and depends on other things. To be in such a way that your state is determined by something else is to be conditioned. For example, all objects are limited to a part of space, or everything that is produced has a cause. Because the conditioned object always has that which is conditioning it, experience is rich with possible questions (e.g., what is the cause of that?). When we look to experience to answer these questions the answers themselves are also conditioned which leads to further questions. By remaining within experience we extend our knowledge, but we never find any rest.

Our own faculty of reason pushes us to seek answers to our questions which are final. This requires that we have an answer that have no further conditions (e.g., a cause without a prior cause). Since all the answers we give remain within experience they are conditioned rather than unconditioned and so we are pushed to provide answers that employ concepts of objects that cannot be found in any experience at all. Some will see a demand to stay within the boundaries of experience and continue the series of conditions forever or until we can no longer answer while others will see it as necessary to provide closure and step beyond experience. A conflict between these two orientations emerges that goes a long way to explain why dogmatic metaphysics is such a constant science as well as the origin of its perennial problems, conflicts ,and solutions. However, there is hope for mediating between these two groups.

Kant points out that if we recognize a difference between appearances of objects and the things themselves we find that the two groups are actually speaking about different things which need not be in conflict with each other. That is, objects, as they appear to us, may very well have causes going back in an infinite regress, however, if we consider objects in themselves then there are no longer conditions of experience which demand this regress. Relieving this contradiction, however, is certainly not enough to take us any closer to having knowledge of anything beyond the boundaries of experience and so for this we will need an entirely different source of cognitions than the resources in experience. To this end Kant mentions reason's practical data, but does not yet explain what this is or how it may help.

Questions

How does metaphysics find a new direction?

Kant recognizes that we cannot determine the metaphysical questions we have positively with respect to how objects exist. However, we can consider our disposition towards answering these questions in particular ways and see if there is any place where our disposition necessitates us to particular answers. If we are necessitated to certain beliefs about metaphysical questions then these certainly can't count as knowledge, but we also cannot ignore them.

Recognizing ourselves as obliged is a kind of necessity that stands outside of the necessity of nature - even if we ought to do something it very well may never happen, but we ought to do it nonetheless. This necessitation of ourselves reveals a dimension of consideration of the self that also stands outside of nature: we consider ourselves as capable of freely bringing about what we ought to do, that is, we posit ourselves as possessing free will. On top of this posit of our freedom and in conjunction with how our moral interests develop, we have a starting point that provides a new direction for metaphysics.

Terminology

unconditioned (Unbedingte), practical (practische)

B xv - xviii, ¶ 11

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[¶11] I should think that the examples of mathematics and natural science, which have become what they now are through a revolution brought about all at once, were remarkable enough that we might reflect on the essential element in the change in the ways of thinking that has been so advantageous to them, and, at least as an experiment, imitate it insofar as their analogy with metaphysics, as rational cognition, might permit. Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to find out something about them a priori through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility of an a priori cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects before they are given to us. This would be just like the first thoughts of Copernicus, who, when he did not make good progress in the explanation of the celestial motions if he assumed that the entire celestial host revolves around the observer, tried to see if he might not have greater success if he made the observer revolve and left the stars at rest. Now in metaphysics we can try in a similar way regarding the intuition of objects. If intuition has to conform to the constitution of the objects, then I do not see how we can know anything of them a priori; but if the object (as an object of the senses) conforms to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, then I can very well represent this possibility to myself. Yet because I cannot stop with these intuitions, if they are to become cognitions, but must refer them as representations to something as their object and determine this object through them, I can assume either that the concepts through which I bring about this determination also conform to the objects, and then I am once again in the same difficulty about how I could know anything about them a priori, or else I assume that the objects, or what is the same thing, the experience in which alone they can be cognized (as given ob- jects) conforms to those concepts, in which case I immediately see an easier way out of the difficulty, since experience itself is a kind of cognition requiring the understanding, whose rule I have to presuppose in myself before any object is given to me, hence a priori, which rule is expressed in concepts a priori, to which all objects of experience must therefore necessarily conform, and with which they must agree. As for objects insofar as they are thought merely through reason, and necessarily at that, but that (at least as reason thinks them) cannot be given in experience at all - the attempt to think them (for they must be capable of being thought) will provide a splendid touchstone of what we assume as the altered method of our way of thinking, namely that we can cognize of things a priori only what we ourselves have put into them.*

* This method, imitated from the method of those who study nature, thus consists in this: to seek the elements of pure reason in that which admits of being confirmed or refuted through an experiment. Now the propositions of pure reason, especially when they venture beyond all boundaries of possible experience, admit of no test by experiment with their objects (as in natural science): thus to experiment will be feasible only with concepts and principles that we assume a priori by arranging the latter so that the same objects can be considered from two different sides, on the one side as objects of the senses and the understanding for experience, and on the other side as objects that are merely thought at most for isolated reason striving beyond the bounds of experience. If we now find that there is agreement with the principle of pure reason when things are considered from this twofold standpoint, but that an unavoidable conflict of reason with itself arises with a single standpoint, then the experiment decides for the correctness of that distinction.

Summary

Metaphysics has so far remained passive with respect to its objects, trying to discover some formula whereby we can conform our thoughts to them. What if, as in natural science and mathematics, we are responsible for the structure or form of objects, and so this structure need not be guessed at but is judged by us a priori?

Commentary

This passage is known for introducing the Copernican turn, which is a reversal of expectations around the conformance between cognition and the object of cognition. This reversal also gives insight into how Kant's project differs from metaphysics that came before and how it analogizes our faculties with the secure sciences.

Kant understands metaphysics prior to critique as supposing that knowledge must conform to objects. This seems fitting since when we are in error we conform our judgments to the world rather than expecting the world to conform to us. However, up to this point in the preface, the topic has been the security of science and how these disciplines became secure only if there is an element of cognition that comes from us a priori acting as a frame or model. Kant intends his approach to metaphysics as an analog of the secure sciences concerning a priori cognitions. We frame, or organize, experience in advance and a primary element we contribute to experience in this framing is the object itself as a way of bringing appearances to a unity. The judgments that bring about this framing must be a priori since they do not depend upon experience and even first produce it.

Earlier metaphysicians assumed all knowledge must conform to objects in both a posteriori (empirical) and a priori judgments. On the other hand Kant maintains that our a posteriori judgments must conform to objects, but proposes that these objects are, as to their form, constructed by us. In short, the notion of an object - a representation of something external to representation - is introduced by us as a way of bringing unity to experience. A famous result of this is that we know objects so far as they appear to us, but we do not know them so far as they do not appear to us (i.e., we do now know things in themselves).

In this we can see reactions to figures such Locke and Leibniz who each aim to treat all cognitions as either stemming from experience (a posteriori) or from supreme principles (a priori) respectively. We can also see a reaction to Hume who would deny security to cognition generally, for example, by rejecting the notion of a necessary connection.

Questions

What are some examples of attempts to conform our thought to objects?

Conforming our thoughts to objects is an attempt to discover rather than construct an ontology (a study of the being of beings). Philosophers generally, including Kant, develop ontologies that recognize objects is intended independent of our thinking. However, this notion of a something independent of thinking (i.e., a representation of something external to representation) is itself a representation in us and which we must account for. Ontology only ever gets so far as communicating this representation of the object as independent. That is, when we communicate our ontology we are still just communicating a representation of objects, not the things themselves.

Beyond having ontologies philosophers demand that these ontologies are correct. If we suppose our thinking must conform to the objects, then to be correct we need some way of checking our representation of objects with the objects themselves. However, we cannot do this directly, for we only have our representations to observe and analyze while the object is considered to stand apart from these representations. In this position so we are left with two options: first, discerning the form of objects logically (through avoiding contradictions) and so indirectly making the limitations of our thinking to be the limitations of reality; or, second, we can try to derive the notion of an object from experience by looking around and seeing what characteristics seem universal, and so making the limitations of our experience of objects to be the limitations of reality. Both of these are problematic in that they never really reach a criteria of verification beyond our own limitations.

Kant still understands objects to be independent things, but wants to avoid incidentally limiting reality by our own cognitive faculties. However, recognizing that we are limited to the analysis of our own representations we can only provide an ontology that relates this form of an object to the manner in which we experience objects. Even if we construct the notion of the object ourselves we still intend this to be about something standing ourself of representation. However, now our ontology will concern how we naturally take our representations to relate to some reality which stands outside of representation.

Is Kant proposing that objects are illusory?

Kant is like most philosophers in recognizing that we intend objects as standing on their own outside of our representations of them, and so, in short, Kant does not take objects to be mere representations or illusory. Kant is proposing that while we represent objects as mind-independant this representation of that which is mind-independent is constructed by us.

Terminology

cognition (Erkenntnis), intuition (Anschauung), experience (Erfahrung)