My
relationship with Descartes’ Meditations
on First Philosophy is one of loving frustration.For a cursory report of the history of my
interpretation: I have gone from not being able to accept the Cogito, and being offended by the 'assumption'
of God, to accepting the Cogito, and
being suspicious of a change in method that resulted in a complete breakdown in
meditation four.Most recently I have
perceived something in the fourth meditation that may allow me to understand a
continued continuity after the Cogito,
and a chance to continue to meditate along with Descartes.I hope to present some of my recent work with
the Meditations to get some feedback
and answer questions (hopefully) about this approach.
In the
first two meditations Descartes does a terrific job explaining what he is doing
in such a way that it follows more like a story than an argument.In the third meditation, there is a change in
presentation: what was a story of adventures in skepticism becomes more like a
scholastic argument for the existence of god, specifically an ontological
proof.The change in presentation left
me wondering how to continue meditating along in the same manner as before,
since, for example, it is easier to understand what it is like to doubt but much
harder to understand what ‘eminence’ is like (this required some digging).Here I allowed myself to simply change my
interpretive method to a more argumentative style, and could accept Descartes
ontological proof with some reservations.(Descartes does not seem to be doing anything other than saying he is
limited and therefore depends on something unlimited, which is acceptable taken
formally – some concerns with this are still available to me, but I will spare
them.)
The
fourth meditation instantly frustrates readers with what appears to be intellectual
negligence.Descartes declares God to be
good:
“For, in the first
place, I discover that it is impossible for him ever to deceive me, for in all
fraud and deceit there is a certain imperfection: and although it may seem that
the ability to deceive is a mark of subtlety or power, yet the will testifies without
doubt of malice and weakness; and such, accordingly, cannot be found in God.”(http://www.wright.edu/cola/descartes/meditation4.html)
Where is the argument for this?Maybe we can attempt to construct something
about evil as privation, and then argue that deception is evil, but I think
there are some reasons this approach is to be avoided.At this point many readers I know throw up
their arms in despair; I was included in this group until recently, when I
found a new direction for my interpretation.
As
Descartes continues in the fourth meditation he says something very
interesting:
“It is the faculty of
will only, or freedom of choice, which I experience to be so great that I am
unable to conceive the idea of another that shall be more ample and extended;
so that it is chiefly my will which leads me to discern that I bear a certain
image and similitude of Deity.” (ibid.)
Speaking formally, our will is equal to God’s, though His
has much greater extension (speaking materially).I had read this a number of times before –
every time I had gone through the Meditations – but the last time I was reading it something clicked.
If we
take Descartes to be looking for an Archimedean point on which he can build a
trust in the world and proceed with certainty in his inquiries into nature, then
it often seems as if the Cogito is
this point on which everything turns.Now, while this is true, it often seems that the infallible ground of
our knowledge is that we cannot doubt our own existence.However, I suggest considering that the real Archimedean point is found in the
fourth meditation - our possession of unlimited will.What is the value of this suggestion?First of all, it leads us back to a new
consideration of Descartes radical doubt.
If we
can doubt the existence of everything “outside of us”, but cannot doubt
ourselves, there is still no reason
to act or take any cognition as the basis for action.If we do act, we are assuming a reason on
which we have acted and a ground in taking the seeming appearing of the world
around us to be legitimate.It seems to
me that this assumption Descartes takes to be a good God.
Now, before we get suspicious, we
do not need to immediately pull in assumptions from Descartes’ (and our)
culture when we are discussing God, rather we should consider exactly what
Descartes requires from the concept ‘God’ for his argument and only that.First of all, we know we are limited, and
depend on something unlimited; second of all, what appears to us is not a lie.I hope to focus on the second of these
leaving the concerns about the first behind.
The development up to the fourth
meditation constitutes an epistemic theodicy.This theodicy seems to be required as an assumption, a priori, for anyone who involves
themselves in the world through actions, since the ground of trusting “external”
objects is something that assures their suitability to know them, which would
need to be a being that can guarantee our continued existence (omnipotence),
has a grasp of thing in themselves (omniscient), is required to acknowledge in
every case (omnipresent), and would not lie to us (epistemically benevolent,
which may be the only benevolence required).
As a student of Kant, I immediately
see a connection between the primacy of will in Descartes and Kant’s Practical
Philosophy, I also see a relation to Kant’s moral proof of God.Now, Descartes does not necessarily see his
argument as I do, however, this interpretive hypothesis explains a lot for me and gives me reasons to return to the text to explore the
predictions it makes. I hope this hypothesis can help anyone reading this to also
see if they can make sense of the continuity of the Meditations.
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