Guidelines for a Metaphysics Journal

   In the following I have taken different elements from the Doctrine of Method in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason which I think may be useful to inform an editor of a possible journal of metaphysics. I will work on some additional remarks later, but this a start.
   I have had various plans to start an online journal at some point, and here I am making some of my plans available so that I might benefit from input. I don't see these guides as being suited to any writing, but it seems specifically well suited (at least as an experiment) for articles on metaphysics.

DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON

Definitions: there are no definitions, only exposition, in metaphysics. Expositions, wherein a concept or principle is clarified, are the result of metaphysical work, not the first step.

Axioms: there are no axioms, since metaphysics uncovers a priori principles by analysis, and does not assume them first.

Demonstrations: there are no demonstrations, since metaphysics proceeds by analysis, not synthesis. Otherwise, there is nothing standing outside of the objects metaphysics has available which is of interest to it.

Polemics: (Internal) There are no genuine polemics in metaphysics, where polemic is understood as one side opposed to another. All parties are engaged in continually clarifying the principles of reason. (External) It is impossible that a proof external to metaphysics can undermine a principle in metaphysics. Metaphysics has no grounds to contest empirical claims except so far as they overstep their bounds.

Hypotheses: There are no hypotheses as Metaphysics is only concerned with what is necessary (necessary here is considered in terms of the category).

Proofs: There is no use of apagogic proofs, since proving how one alternative is not possible will not necessarily reveal any solution (consider the Antinomies); such proofs can have use from a skeptical, but not a critical, perspective. Proofs in metaphysics must first prove the objective validity of their principles or concepts.

CANON OF PURE REASON
-Metaphysics aims to clarify the means and ends of reason, not to bring reason further to its ends (which would require synthesis). No claims should be advanced synthetically, rather a critical attitude should be maintained towards whatever material is provided.

-The distinction between Practical and Theoretical should be actively preserved and explicit stated. All activity should be considered both in terms of how it cognizes its object, as well as any maxims of the activity. Even our own metaphysical research should not go unconsidered as to the conditions of its aims.

-The divisions in opining, believing and knowing should be preserved, and it should be clear which sort of taking-to-be-true is used in any case. Metaphysics does not have any need for taking-anything-for-true which is not necessary, and its powers are all spent on the clarification of the necessary.

ARCHITECTONIC OF PURE REASON
-Philosophy (distinct from metaphysics) is not an actual science, but a science in idea. Philosophy as science is the legislation of human reason. We are concerned with advancing towards such a legislature concerning two different areas: causes of nature and causes of freedom. The would-be philosopher continually seeks a more unified life.

-The division between the different branches of metaphysics, which should be preserved, are as follows:
1) ontology (transcendental philosophy)
2) rational physiology (containing rational physics and rational psychology)
3) rational cosmology
4) rational theology

HISTORY OF PURE REASON
-The metaphysician's interest in doing history is in order to hold that history together under one view - that of pure reason. Whatever is mathematical, empirical, scriptural, &c in the history, in terms of its theses, hypotheses or positions, should be clarified from the main body of the metaphysical work. Where principles are blurred with what is unnecessary, then the history should document the error of the inclusion (or exclusion).

-There should be a unity in all the sciences, and since history is a body of knowledge, the principle that organizes it also allows for their unity, if not agreement.

Understanding Authenticity and Inauthenticity in 'Being and Time'

   In the interest of trying to make things simple before they are complicated I want to suggest a way of guiding ones reading of Being and Time through a simple statement of the ultimate relevance of the authentic/inauthentic distinction. There is a lot to draw out of a distinction such as the authentic/inauthentic, but we should strive to situate ourselves with the term in such a way that it informs a larger scope of our interpretation before we begin to suggest elements that are not so obvious (yet which may be quite important nonetheless).
   'Authentic' and 'inauthentic' can become distracting because they have an air of moralizing about them. Does Heidegger mean to see that people who are inauthentic, or who spend more time being inauthentic than authentic, are somehow bad? Even though Heidegger denies this flat out in the text, there is still a tendency to read him as doing so with a wink. But my questions for such readers are: how is such a reading helpful in clarifying the core issue of the text? Would we choose to distract ourselves from what the main issue is while at the same time needing to contradict what is said in the text about authentic and inauthentic? Does moralizing seem to offer any benefit to the main objectives of the text? Does Heidegger ever suggest in other works that such moralizing is beneficial for understanding his work?
   Heidegger himself does not necessarily do a good job of clarifying what role the terms are to serve in his work explicitly (and with good reason, since he works through exposition), but if we are allowed to assume that he did not develop these terms blindly, or on a tangent, then we should be able to see why these centrally featured terms are relevant for the main theme of Being and Time.
   The main problem of Being and Time is simple to put: how do we formulate the question of the meaning of Being (read as: to be). Clearly, we can say, "What is the meaning of Being?", so what is outstanding in the formulation? In short, the meaning of the question! We need to make sure that we actually ask about Being (to be), but how are we to know what to do? It's not clear how to understand the way Heidegger wants to ask the question at first. In fact, we can understand how he could by no means provide an answer to the meaning of this question of the meaning of Being prior to working the question itself out. The very formulation of the question is a puzzle that occupies the whole of Being and Time, and it is examining this puzzle that gets us farther into an understanding of the text.
   In some way we must make a theme of 'Being' such that we can inquire into it, but we must do so in such a way that we can first figure out what is being discussed at all. Heidegger may as well ask "what is the meaning of 'puffinstuff'?", since he can't come out and tell us, and may not himself understand precisely what he is asking about. But he does know what he is asking into (at least through a vague fore-understanding, something average), and he can provide a great deal of hints that hook us into the tradition of talking about 'Being' and 'beings'; these clues are negative, and he employs them in circling around trying to get ever closer to what he wants to discuss. Now, how does authenticity get us closer in our circling to an understanding of Being?
   A rough definition of 'authentic' may help: ones encounter is 'authentic' whenever the Being (to be) of what is encountered becomes a concern. So, to use an example, if I am using a hammer and it 'breaks' or 'fails', then I may not take this in stride. I may stop and look at the thing which has become conspicuous. When the equipment fails, we can make a theme of its Being (the manner in which it is). Now, the Being of Dasein is a question for Fundamental Ontology, and Dasein is not ready or present-at-hand like a hammer, and so Dasein does not simply break or fall apart. However, the equipment which we may engage with is not itself authentic or inauthentic - it is our concern with it that is. Do we "encounter ourselves" authentically or inauthentically? This is a possibility of our Being, and just as an authentic encounter with the hammer makes a theme of its Being possible for us, an "authentic encounter" with Dasein would make the Being of Dasein a possible theme.
   (Along with Heidegger, we should be wary of treating Dasein as something ready or present-at-hand. This is why I put 'encountering ourselves' above in scare quotes above: we clearly do not encounter ourselves in some manner akin to a hammer. This should be evident in that authentic and inauthentic encounters with objects ready or present-at-hand are possibly ways for Dasein to be.)
   Now, Being-towards-death, resoluteness, &c are all important in how we are to understand Dasein's being authentic. I will not develop the interpretation of these further here since my intentions are simply to indicate the relevance of the authentic/inauthentic distinction and provide an indication of some direction from there.
   Now, does 'inauthentic' serve us in any way in terms of how it is possible to make something the theme of some discourse? We can note right away that it at least forms a different possibility for the Being of Dasein from authentic so we can narrow down further what the authentic is. A more interesting thing to note about the inauthentic is that, in being closely aligned with 'averageness' and 'everydayness' it is closely aligned with the starting point of the inquiry - we cannot define 'Being' and then inquire into it, we begin with a more or less average understanding of Being, an understanding that for many is influenced by the tradition of philosophy in such a way that asking into its meaning is daft. The tradition coaxes us into inauthenticity.
   The problem with the question of the meaning of Being is that we do take it inauthentically (not concerning our Being) at first, or not at all. The work serves as an exposition to the question, and this exposition of the question is itself the answer, in a sense, as far as philosophy has to offer it. What does the exposition consist in? Does it consists in going from an inauthentic encounter with Being to an authentic encounter with Being? (I note that Kant, in the Critique of Pure Reason, Doctrine of Method, says that Philosophy cannot properly define anything, but can rather only operate on expositions of its concepts. Heidegger seems to obey this, and reveal something very important about this remark by Kant - even if by accident.) What of 'Phenomenology' as a discourse? Can such a discourse on Being be possible in any other way than one which forces the reader into authenticity?
   Perhaps these sorts of reflections can be crucial for understanding Being and Time, perhaps not, but these occur to me as powerful suggestions of the importance and relation of 'authentic' and 'inauthentic' to the overarching goals of the text.

Principle and Practice of Philosophy

(This short work of questions relates to some earlier posts on problems: Philosophical Problems I and Philosophical Problems II)

   In principle answers to problems of arithmetic have a single answer, yet in practice there is the possibility of error, and so there may be a variety of answers parading as correct. However, this does not lead us to maintain that there is more than one answer to the summation of any two integers. While arithmetic has necessity in its results being singular, philosophy has this, as well as the necessity of its questions.
   (If you find yourself disturbed by the above claim I would be interested in hearing why. I will list two possible reasons rhapsodically: perhaps you are concerned that I am claiming that philosophy has a sort of preeminence in importance over other sciences, or maybe you think I am just wrong - philosophy is mostly silly, and much more a sign of decadence than necessity. I would enjoy to hear other reasons.)
   What does it mean to say that the questions of philosophy are necessary? It is not necessary that any two integers are added together, so why should it be necessary to ask any other question? It is hard to characterize what a philosophical question is like - but for now we have this one element that I am asserting: the questions themselves are necessary. Looking closer at this, we may ask that just because a question is necessary in principle, it may not actually be asked in practice. Sticking with the attitude of assertion, there is a further relationship between the results of philosophy and the questions both being necessary that may help us: the questions are the results of philosophy.
   Assertion continued: philosophy is not a science of knowing, but of asking. This helps us to formulate an ideal of philosophy: the ideal is something towards which the project of philosophy aims at which it also cannot attain, something that structures the inquiry that is philosophy. As a suggestion here, I will consider that what is sought in philosophy is the most questionable. (Is this the question of Being, or what this question is a symbol for?)
   In the first Critique, Doctrine of Method, Kant idealized the philosopher as the one who directly gives the rules to reason. This characterizes the philosopher as one who has a power of determination. To begin with this seems to directly contradict what I was above describing as the goal of philosophy, since asking and authorizing are very different activities, but maybe we should consider a moment the difference between philosophy and the philosopher. Philosophy is a sort of pursuit of the highest question, the philosopher is one who pursues in a particular way so that he can authorize reason. Does asking the highest question amount to a total exposure and authority over what can be thought by man?